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ABSTRACT

A natural interest in learning more about education in the People's Republic of China has grown out of the reestablishment of relationships between the United States and mainland China. This study, one of a series to help inform the American educational community about significant educational developments in other countries, provides basic background information to understanding recent developments in the educational system of mainland China. Based mainly on primary source material, the study summarizes the course of the educational revolution which was initiated in China in the spring of 1966 and provides a succinct analysis of the impact of this wide ranging upheaval on the organization and conduct of the educational enterprise in that country. Data on the number of higher education institutions of various types and universities within the Peoples Republic of China are appended. (Author/KSM)

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THE EDUCATIONAL REVOLUTION IN

CHINA

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

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FOREWORD

With the reestablishing of a broad range of relationships between the United States and mainland China which have grown out of the initiatives of President Nixon, there has been a natural interest on the part of a large number of Americans to learn more about education in the People's Republic of China. In addition to the widespread general interest among educators and students, there are the more specialized interests of those concerned with comparative education and those who are looking forward to the emerging prospects of various educational exchange activities.

This study helps provide the basic background information essential to an understanding of recent developments in the educational system of mainland China. Based mainly on primary source material from the People's Republic of China, the study summarizes the course of the "educational revolution" which was initiated in China in the spring of 1966 and provides a compact analysis of the impact of this wide-ranging upheaval on the organization and conduct of the educational enterprise in that country.

There can be little doubt that the period covered by this study encompasses one of the most extraordinary sets of events in educational change in contemporary times. In brief compass, yet with many direct quotations from original sources to help convey the sweep and tone of the events and actions reported, the study traces the repudiation of the former school system, the virtual suspension of regular school activities for periods of up to 4 years, and the gradual piecing together of a new kind of educational establishment more nearly in line with the views of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

This study is another in the series commissioned by the Office of Education's Institute of International Studies as part of its continuing effort to help inform the American educational community about significant educational developments in other countries. In addition to making readily available in English some educational perspectives quite different from those American educators normally have experience with or access to, the study is also intended to contribute to those dimensions of the Institute's mission which are concerned with helping foster intercultural understanding and international cooperation.

The author of this study, Dr. Robert D. Barendsen, is the Office of Education's senior specialist on education in the Far East. He has previously written extensively on the subject of education in China. Among his earlier publications are the monograph *Half-Work, Half-*

Study Schools in Communist China; Recent Experiments with Self-Supporting Educational Institutions, published by the Office of Education in 1961, and articles on Chinese education in the October 1966 and May 1972 issues of *American Education*.

Robert Leestma
*Associate Commissioner
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CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Foreword	iii
I. Introduction	1
II. Development of the Revolution	3
Rationale and Inception	3
The Heyday of the Red Guards	6
A Revived Campaign To Resume Classes	9
Establishment of Worker-Peasant Control	12
A New Look Begins To Emerge	15
The Reconstruction Effort Gathers Momentum	18
Defining the Limits of Change	23
The Continuing Search for New Solutions	26
III. Major Features of the Emerging System	31
IV. Some Concluding Observations	37
Notes	43
Bibliographical Note	45
Appendixes	
A. Number of higher educational institutions of various types in the People's Republic of China: November 1965	47
B. Universities in the People's Republic of China, with location and date of establishment: November 1965	49

I. INTRODUCTION

In June 1966, schools throughout the People's Republic of China were closed and a thorough reorientation and restructuring of the entire educational system was initiated. This development occurred at an early stage in the convulsive "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," the combined ideological reform campaign and political power struggle that engulfed China in the latter half of the 1960's. For more than 2 years thereafter, little that would be recognized in most of the world as the normal functions of educational institutions took place in the classrooms of mainland China. Only in the fall of 1968 did reports indicate that sizable numbers of primary and secondary schools were once again operating, and it was the autumn of 1970 before appreciable numbers of colleges announced that they were again enrolling new students.

The final shape of the new educational system is still by no means certain, for exploration and experimentation are actively continuing at all levels. Nevertheless, sufficient information is available at this writing (September 1972) to enable one to trace the main events in the development of this educational revolution, to outline the principal changes made in the organization and conduct of educational work, and to make a tentative assessment of the significance of the new system and its future prospects.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE REVOLUTION

Rationale and Inception

The basic reason for the wrenching decision in mid-1966 to discard the existing educational system and build a new one is to be found in the concern of the aging leadership in Peking, headed by Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung, for the future continuation of the course it has set for China. Realizing that his goals cannot fully be attained in his waning lifetime, Chairman Mao has been increasingly preoccupied for many years with ensuring the dedication of the young people of China to his interpretation of Communist ideology and the system of government under Communist Party leadership. He has been concerned that the youth of present-day mainland China have not personally experienced the salutary hardening and tempering effects of active participation in the civil war and the mass political action campaigns of the early years after the Communist takeover of China in 1949. Mao's fears about the softness of contemporary Chinese youth are compounded, furthermore, by his well-known and pervasive distrust of all intellectuals, whom he has constantly viewed as essentially unreliable elements. He has consistently seen only the "working class"—meaning primarily the peasants and other manual workers—as his dependable supporters. Thus the main thrust of his educational policy since 1949 has been to produce a new type of intelligentsia by making the necessary general and specialized education available to politically reliable working-class elements and insisting that all students be required to receive regular political education in schools and participate regularly in manual labor as part of the school program.¹

Despite the fact that Mao's approach had seemed to dominate educational policy during most of the post-1949 period, the Chinese leader apparently became convinced eventually that the educational system was not working out as he expected. As he saw it, the old type of bourgeois intellectuals continued to staff and run the schools, to stress academic subjects rather than political consciousness or labor performance, to inculcate the values of their class, and, after long years of tutelage, to mold products in their own image. In other words, Mao came to the conclusion that after 17 years of Communist rule, the educational system was not only failing to produce dedicated successors to carry on the proletarian revolution, but was actually nurturing

bourgeois-oriented individuals whose viewpoints were opposed to that cause.

This was a drastic conclusion, demanding equally drastic counter-measures. The first major move in the counterattack came on May 7, 1966, when Mao made a brief statement that is still cited throughout China as the basic guideline for what was to become known as the "revolution in education." Concerning students, Mao said:

While their main task is to study, they should in addition to their studies learn other things, that is, industrial work, farming, and military affairs. They should also criticize the bourgeoisie. The period of schooling should be shortened, education should be revolutionized, and the domination of our schools by bourgeois intellectuals should by no means be allowed to continue.²

A few days after this directive from Mao, on May 16, the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued a circular calling for an all-out struggle to repudiate the "considerable number" of "anti-Party and anti-Socialist representatives of the bourgeoisie" who had infiltrated Party and Government organs at the national as well as the provincial and municipal level. Referring to those who had "sneaked into the Party, the government, the army and the various spheres of culture" as "a bunch of counterrevolutionary revisionists," the circular went on to say that "when conditions are ripe, they would seize power and turn the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie." Specifically included among the bourgeois representatives to be ferreted out, according to the circular, were "so-called 'academic authorities' who oppose the Party and socialism."³

In the ensuing purge, which eventually toppled many leading Party and Government officials, high ranking educational policymakers and administrators suffered heavily. For example, Lu Ting-i, head of the Propaganda Department of the Party Central Committee and the Party's chief spokesman on education since the 1950's, was removed, and the leadership of the Ministries of Education and Higher Education came under fire. A number of prominent university administrators also lost their posts.

Among the first college heads to be displaced was Lu Ping, a Party member who was President of China's leading institution of higher education, Peking University. Lu was criticized by several members of his faculty in a wall poster put up at the school on May 25, accusing him of belittling the significance of Mao's ideas and the importance of labor, discriminating against worker and peasant students, and generally running the university according to bourgeois concepts. The poster was personally endorsed by Mao on June 1, and Lu was summarily dismissed the following day. A few days later the President of another leading institution, Nanking University, who was also the Party head at the school, was deposed for similar reasons. These were among the earliest of about 50 top college officials who were purged during

the year.¹ The controversy touched off by the May 25 wall poster quickly spread to other schools, so that by mid-June many institutions in Peking and elsewhere were deeply involved in agitation on the issue.

At this point, on June 13, the régime announced that enrollment of students in higher educational institutions for the coming year would be postponed for 6 months in order to allow sufficient time to complete the Cultural Revolution movement in the colleges and senior middle (secondary) schools,² and to change completely the existing system of competitive college entrance examinations. The announcement said that "the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is very acute in quite a number of universities, colleges, and middle schools," and that the system of college entrance examinations had remained a vestige of bourgeois influence and was hampering the enrollment of "revolutionary young people from among the workers, peasants, and soldiers." It added that "new methods" for selecting college students were being sought.³

In an editorial on June 18, the *Jen Min Jih Pao* (People's Daily), the Peking newspaper organ of the Party Central Committee, gave some idea of what the new methods would be. It said that college (and senior middle) students would henceforth be chosen by "recommendation and selection" rather than entrance examination, but it did not spell out how this procedure would work. The editorial added that the change in the admission system would be only the first step in a "complete revolution in the whole of the old educational system" in which the content of courses, teaching materials, tests, promotion policy, and arrangements for combining education with productive labor would be transformed. The most concrete suggestion was in regard to teaching material, where it called for compiling new materials "under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung's thought" and for the study of Mao's writings as a compulsory course in all schools from primary to collegiate level. The editorial ended with a strident warning to the "high and mighty anti-Party and anti-socialist 'authorities' who are occupying positions in the education world" that their "wickedness" would be exposed and their influence permanently eradicated.⁴

In the period following the appearance of this editorial and continuing throughout July and into August, the Peking press published numerous statements by middle school and college students supporting its arguments. Common to most of these statements was the contention that the current system was elitist in orientation, emphasizing academic proficiency and neglecting political education and labor. Abolition of college entrance exams and enrollment of outstanding experienced workers and peasants, regardless of whether they had completed senior middle school, was endorsed. Most comments condemned the prevailing 17-year course leading to college graduation as far too long, and some recommended that it be reduced by up to half. One comment by a group of students at Peking People's University suggested that

collegiate liberal arts courses be reduced from 5 to not more than 3, and generally 2 years' duration.⁸

The central authorities issued no further pronouncements on educational reform until August 8, when a paragraph on "Teaching Reform" was included in a lengthy set of guidelines for the Cultural Revolution adopted by a plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee. This paragraph called reform of the educational system an "extremely vital task" and stressed the necessity of "making education serve proletarian politics and having education integrated with productive labor, so that those who get an education may . . . become socialist-minded, cultured laborers." It repeated the points made in Mao's May directive, and added the specific injunction that curriculum and teaching materials should be simplified.⁹

The Heyday of the Red Guards

Shortly after this pronouncement, the now-famous Red Guards suddenly came to national prominence and discussion of specific educational changes was virtually suspended for a prolonged period.

The origin of the Red Guards is somewhat obscure, but their early members are generally believed to have been activist elements who emerged from the turmoil in Peking's schools in May and June. The first group under that name to be acknowledged by Peking authorities was at the middle school attached to Tsinghua University, China's most prestigious technological institution. The stated purpose of this group, in existence by at least June 24, was to eradicate the "revisionists" in the educational field and all other reactionaries, and it openly advocated the use of force and violence to achieve this end.

During July and early August, particularly after Mao endorsed them on August 1, groups of this kind must have been formed at many middle schools and colleges throughout the country, for they appeared en masse at a giant rally in Peking attended by Mao on August 18. Two days later they took to the streets in a campaign to eliminate all vestiges of "old" ideas, customs, culture, and habits. On August 31, Premier Chou En-lai announced a Party Central Committee decision encouraging students and Red Guards to travel freely about the country to "exchange revolutionary experiences" and carry out the campaign to unseat reactionaries. Great numbers of young people soon fanned out throughout the nation in loosely organized groups. Eight times between August 18 and November 26 Mao personally greeted Peking rallies of these groups attended by a total of more than 11 million Red Guards and other activist youths.¹⁰

The broad activities of these young vigilante groups have been widely reported throughout the world, and need not be repeated here. It is clear, however, that many teachers and educational administrators were included among the objects of their harassment and intimidation.

The reasons for the Peking leadership's sponsorship and encouragement of the Red Guard movement are complex, but two major factors seem to have been involved. On the one hand, Mao and his supporters were by this time deeply committed to a major purge of his opponents in the Party and Government organs (including the army) at all levels, and the young students provided convenient outside "shock troops" to help dislodge the enemies within the Establishment. At the same time, the activities in which the young people were engaging constituted precisely the kind of massive practical lesson in political education that Mao felt the contemporary young people desperately needed. This interest in the "steeling" potential of the Red Guard movement was reflected in a *Jen Min Jih Pao* editorial on the day preceding the great rally of Red Guards on August 18. Under the blunt title "Learn to Swim by Swimming," the editorial said that—

...all revolutionary young people should go out to face the world and brave the storm. It is impossible for a revolutionary to grow up as a hot-house plant. He must toughen himself in the teeth of the great storms and waves.¹¹

The high tide of the Red Guard peregrinations came in the late summer and early fall of 1966, but the excessive zeal of the youthful activists soon threatened to get out of hand, and by mid-November the dominant Maoist group in Peking was beginning to call upon them to return to their home areas. By December 1 a firm deadline of the 20th of that month was set for cessation of all junketing. Traveling by young people was to be curtailed through removal of the free surface transportation and food that had been previously afforded. At this same time, however, the middle schools and colleges, which had not reopened for the fall semester, were ordered to suspend classes until the end of the school year (summer 1967) in order to develop further the Cultural Revolution in these institutions. One aspect of what the young people would be asked to do after they returned home was made clear at the close of the year, on December 31, when the Party Central Committee and State Council (the top Government administrative body) ordered the Army to send officers to all schools to organize teachers and students into military-type units and to provide these units with 15 to 20 days of political and military training.¹²

Perhaps because this prospect did not please them, many students ignored the initial appeals to curtail their travels. In January and early February, as the turmoil that they had done much to produce brought China to the brink of civil war and necessitated the intervention of the army in an effort to restore order, the authorities were forced to repeat their orders that Red Guards and revolutionary students should return home.¹³

On February 4, 1967, the day after the latest of these appeals, the Party Central Committee took another important action; it issued a notification calling for resumption of classes at all primary schools

before the end of the month. This announcement, which constituted the first clear confirmation that schools at this level also had been closed during the previous semester, ordered teachers and students to return to their schools and elect "revolutionary committees" including 5th- and 6th-grade students as well as teachers. They were also enjoined to purge all those staff members who stubbornly adhered to a reactionary stand and to "arrange for their reform through labor." The notice also stated that the fifth- and sixth-grade students should study the quotations of Chairman Mao, read three of his articles, and study the program for the cultural revolution outlined in August 1966. Classes in the lower four grades should learn the Chinese ideographs and study Mao's quotations. Pupils in all six grades were also to learn to sing revolutionary songs. After mentioning these requirements, the notice added that all pupils must also be taught "some general arithmetic and scientific knowledge."¹⁴

Two weeks later, on February 19, the Central Committee issued a similar document concerning middle schools. After again calling on students to cease their travels and return to their home areas by March 1 at the latest, it ordered them to "attend their lessons" and "make revolution" simultaneously in their schools. It was evident that the latter activity was to predominate. The "revolutionary" students and staff were to elect committees to carry on the Cultural Revolution in the schools and direct all other aspects of school work. These committees were charged with purging reactionary teachers and staff who resisted remolding. But their tasks were now extended to include reorganizing and purifying the ranks of the Red Guard organizations, ending the struggles between different revolutionary factions, and vindicating teachers and students erroneously branded earlier as "counter-revolutionaries." The activists were specifically warned: "Do not reject and overthrow everyone," and were explicitly cautioned against using violence and destroying school equipment. The directive said little about the content of school lessons, calling mainly for careful study of Mao's writings and Party documents on the Cultural Revolution. It added that "some time" should be devoted to "reviewing" mathematics, physics, chemistry, foreign languages, and other unspecified "essential courses."¹⁵

A third directive, relating to higher educational institutions, was issued on March 7. Like the secondary school document, it called upon all college students to return to their schools within 2 weeks, establish new leadership organs, and continue the Cultural Revolution in their own institutions. They were enjoined to cleanse the ranks of the Red Guards as well as of the faculty members, and in general to "rectify their thinking, styles of work, and organization." Nothing at all was said in this directive about resuming academic classes. Students were asked only to study Mao's works and to look into ways in which the educational system could be reformed.¹⁶

On the same day on which this directive was released, Mao Tse-tung ordered the army to participate directly in reopening schools at all levels and carrying out the revolution in these institutions.¹⁷ This was a considerable expansion of the role of the military establishment, which since December had been instructed to provide short-term military and political training in the schools. Thus by early March of 1967 the regime had made it very clear that it wanted the young activists to restrict the scope of their revolutionary activities to their own institutions, and to conduct them even there in a firm but nonviolent way. Furthermore, it was equally clear that the young activists themselves were deemed in need of more discipline and supervision.

As the spring of 1967 unfolded, however, the return to school failed to materialize. Many Red Guard students were by this time deeply involved in the loosely organized groups of "revolutionary" elements who were unseating Party and Government bodies throughout the country, and they were apparently reluctant to return to the narrow confines of their own school premises. Renewed appeals for their return, made in late April, seem to have gone largely unheeded. Those students who did return to their campuses became embroiled in many-sided factional struggles for supremacy between rival groups. These struggles, which continued throughout the summer of 1967 and were often violent in nature, precluded any return to normal school activities.¹⁸

A Revived Campaign To Resume Classes

In early fall 1967 the Peking leadership began a renewed effort to end the internal strife that had nearly torn China apart earlier in the year. As part of this effort, Mao Tse-tung himself condemned the emergence of factions among the working class and particularly called upon the Red Guards and other revolutionary student organizations to end their confrontations and unite in new leadership alliances.¹⁹

Later in the autumn, another campaign was launched to reopen school classes, thus unmistakably confirming the failure of the attempt to achieve the same result the previous spring. This campaign, begun in October, was first publicized in the press in an editorial in the October 25 issue of the *Jen Min Jih Pao* under the title "Universities and Middle and Primary Schools Must Resume Classes While Making Revolution." The editorial said that whereas classes had earlier been suspended in order to facilitate revolutionary activities, it was now necessary to resume classes in order to continue the educational revolution. Pointing out that during the last year and a half the "revisionists" in educational work had been exposed and their theories and practices criticized, it called upon the revolutionary teachers and students to continue the struggle against revisionism (and also individual self-interest), but also to step up their attention to devising a "new socialist educational system" conforming to the ideas of Mao Tse-tung.²⁰

Although the editorial gave no further suggestions regarding the structure or curriculum of the new system, during the next few weeks the mass media gave a few examples of how some schools were organizing their work. Primary schools in Shanghai were reported to be operating on a schedule of 18 to 21 lesson periods per week, and "putting special emphasis on political and ideological education." The curriculum included study of several articles and statements by Mao, Chinese language, arithmetic, "general knowledge," revolutionary songs, drawing, military physical education, and factory and farm work, but no indication of the time allotted to each subject was given. The school program was very deeply permeated by politics: all teachers had had a month's special training in Mao's thought before the delayed opening of school, and some schools had adopted propagation of Mao's ideas as the most important guideline in preparing new teaching materials. Political content was injected into the curriculum wherever possible. For example, one report said that—

in the arithmetic lessons for the lower grades exercises are given for the pupils to work out how workers and . . . peasants were exploited by capitalists and landlords. Thus class education is combined with arithmetic.²¹

On November 3, the *Jen Min Jih Pao* published a special group of articles putting forward for discussion tentative proposals for reform advanced by several institutions of higher education. Among them the one that received the greatest amount of follow-up publicity and attention was the proposal of Tungchi University in Shanghai, one of China's best-known engineering universities. The activist leadership at Tungchi proposed to reorganize the university by combining it with an industrial designing unit and a construction unit. The new entity, to be called the "May 7 Commune," would be formed into "classes" consisting of a combination of teachers, students, designers, engineers, and ordinary laborers. These groups would be organized along military lines, and would undertake to carry out building projects. The student component of the groups would learn while participating in these projects. It was felt that the engineering course could be reduced from 5 to 3 years because the students would learn faster and better in this situation. In the first year, they would spend half their time at ordinary labor; in the second year, they would spend two-thirds of their time learning designing techniques; and in the third year, they would concentrate more of their time on specialized studies. In all years, they would also have courses in Mao Tse-tung's thought and military affairs.²²

During most of November, the press carried an appreciable number of reports that schools at all levels were reopening, particularly in the larger cities. But at the end of that month there were signs that the revived effort was again encountering difficulties. On November 26, the Party's Peking newspaper carried another editorial repeating more

urgently the call to resume classes. After making its appeal, the editorial added: "Quite unlike what some people think, acting according to this directive is not 'restoration of the old' or 'reformism.'" Later it addressed itself directly to the Red Guards in saying that all words and actions impeding the resumption of classes while carrying out educational revolution were erroneous. By these statements the Party's organ revealed that one of the ingenious arguments used by Red Guards who were reluctant to return to school—namely, that resuming classes while working out changes was a "reformist" rather than a "revolutionary" approach—was still a real problem. In response, the editorial compromised by concluding:

Letting class resume and carrying out revolution means teaching in the course of criticism and repudiation, learning in the course of criticism and repudiation. It means putting "destruction" first with "construction" implicit in it.²³

This formulation seemed to place priority on the negative aspect of the educational revolution—i.e., on the criticism, repudiation, and destruction of the old ("revisionist") educational system—rather than on the positive task of shaping a new system. The formula was quickly picked up by activist groups throughout the country, and its adoption led to rapid diminution of further concrete proposals for changes in the structure of the educational system. By early 1968 there was virtually no reportage or discussion in the mass media concerning academic or cultural courses. To be sure, students were now reported to be on hand in many schools and colleges, but their time was occupied mainly in study groups devoted to Mao's works, or in critiques of the old educational system and its bourgeois masters.

As the winter of 1968 wore on, the official media increasingly urged the students to spend more and more time on self-criticism—particularly the criticism of preoccupation with self-interest. This caveat was combined with growing warnings about the dangers of factionalism and the threat of "anarchy" raised by struggles between opposing groups. The situation was well characterized by radio broadcasts and newspaper items in February. One broadcast on February 6, for example, reported that—

"Civil wars" are still being fought and struggle by violence still occurs at Shanghai Science and Technology University. This has made it impossible to resume normal classes and carry out revolution. . . .²⁴

On the following day, Shanghai's leading newspaper called on the University activists to stop attacking each other, dismantle the battle ramps on the campus, and turn their attack against the real enemies.

Reports and appeals of this kind, including admonitions against students who were loafing at home and idly roaming the streets rather than returning to their school, were common in this period. By early March, on the occasion of the first anniversary of Mao's orders to the army to

enter all schools, many commemorative articles in the media made it clear that the second effort to resume classes had not achieved its objective. Disruption and confusion still prevailed in many of the Nation's classrooms, where students were unruly and teachers were hesitant and fearful. The March 7 anniversary provided a convenient occasion to stress the importance of the army's role in providing military training and political tutelage in the schools, and to underline the virtues of discipline and order.

As summer approached, it became more and more evident that the authorities' appeals were being ignored. Viewing the situation from Hong Kong as the end of another school year came in sight, one veteran journalistic China-watcher summarized it as follows:

Insofar as there is now a school system operating in Communist China, it is mostly one for studying Mr. Mao's thoughts, repudiating the alleged revisionist ideas of Lin Shao-chi and other capitalist roaders, reviewing *Jen Min Jih Pao* [Peoples Daily] editorials, and trying to counteract factionalism . . . by preaching selfless devotion to assigned tasks.²⁵

Despite the preachments and increasingly urgent official entreaties, factional fighting among rival activist campus groups, each contending to be the true supporters of Mao and his principles, continued unabated into the summer of 1968. Some of the fiercest fighting took place at the two most important colleges in the capital, Peking and Tsinghua Universities, where the opposing sides reportedly engaged in gun battles in which 18 students were killed during the brief period between June 30 and July 8.²⁶

Confronted with large numbers of restless youth clustered mainly on the campuses and in the streets in urban areas, the regime tried to alleviate some of the pressure by moving young people out to the countryside. Beginning in late spring, exhortations urging recent graduates of middle schools and colleges to accept assignments to work in rural areas had begun to appear frequently in the press. Throughout the several succeeding months, appeals to do agricultural or industrial work in remote regions were prominent features in the media, and several tens of thousands of young people reportedly pledged themselves to respond by settling down and "integrating" with the workers and peasants.

Establishment of Worker-Peasant Control

It was at this critical juncture, in mid-1968, that Mao Tse-tung again personally and publicly intervened with a series of several closely spaced directives related to education. The first came on July 21, in the form of one of the Chairman's brief "instructions," a type of communication that had become, since fall 1967, the highest level of policy pronouncement in China. Commenting on the experience of a Shanghai factory, Mao said:

It is still necessary to have universities; here I refer mainly to colleges of science and engineering. However, it is essential to shorten the length of schooling, revolutionize education, put proletarian politics in command, and follow the road of the Shanghai Machine Tool Plant in training technicians from among the workers. Students should be selected from among workers and peasants with practical experience and they should return to production work after a few years of study.²⁷

The experience of the Shanghai Machine Tool Plant to which Mao referred stressed that technicians promoted from the ranks of veteran workers performed better than university graduates. Basing its conclusion on this evidence, the Plant's leadership recommended that in the future all candidates for higher education be drawn from among workers who had had between 2 and 5 years of job experience after finishing either junior or senior middle school. Following 3 or 4 years of college study, mainly under the tutelage of older workers and with a substantial part of the instruction taking place in industrial workshops, the young workers would again be asked to go through a probationary period of manual labor before assuming technical positions.²⁸

A few days after Mao's instruction on higher education was published, a new instrumentality emerged on the educational scene. A group consisting mainly of workers, organized as a "Mao Tse-tung Thought Propaganda Team," entered Tsinghua University in Peking. Mao's support of the group's activity was conveyed symbolically in early August through giving the team some exotic fruit (mangoes) presented to him by a foreign visitor, and soon hastily formed similar teams, consisting of dozens and even hundreds of workers, were entering colleges and lower schools in cities throughout the Nation.

Mao's endorsement of the Teams was made explicit in another informal "instruction" issued in late August:

In carrying out the proletarian revolution in education it is essential to have working class leadership; it is essential for the masses of workers to take part and, with the cooperation of Liberation Army fighters, to bring about a revolutionary "three-in-one" combination . . . with the activists among the students, teachers, and workers in the schools. . . . The workers' propaganda teams should stay permanently in the schools . . . and they will always lead the schools. In the countryside the schools should be managed by the poor and lower middle peasants—the most reliable ally of the working class.²⁹

This formulation made it clear that in Mao's view all schools should be run permanently and directly by "working class" elements—the urban proletariat and the rural peasants.

Introduction of Propaganda Teams into the schools had great significance. It confirmed that the unrest in schools and colleges had continued unabated, failing to respond to either the appeals of the political leadership or the guidance of the military mentors who had tried for nearly a year and a half to restore order. The appearance of the Teams also signalled the final subjugation of the Red Guards and other student

activists who had dissipated their prestige through protracted factional disputes. Furthermore, it marked the beginning of a still more intensive campaign of criticism against all intellectuals. In sum, it represented a new start, with a new spearhead, for the effort to change the educational system. And indeed it was recognized as such. The official news agency, in a full review of the situation a few weeks later, acknowledged that earlier progress had been "thwarted" and that the "proletarian revolution in education" had really "begun" as the Mao Tse-tung Thought Propaganda Teams moved into schools and colleges.³⁰

The renewed campaign against intellectuals struck at young people in the process of being educated as well as at their older mentors. From late July into September both students and teachers were exhorted to abandon their "haughty airs" and superiority feelings and humbly learn from workers and peasants. All intellectuals were chastised for arrogance and lack of dependability, and the Red Guards in particular were singled out for criticism that accused them of lapsing into unconstructive self-indulgence after performing meritorious service in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. The only way to salvation prescribed for both older and younger intellectuals was to "integrate" themselves with workers and peasants. In another "instruction" in mid-September, Mao called on young people especially to follow this course:

The majority or the vast majority of students . . . can integrate themselves with the workers, peasants, and soldiers, and some have made inventions or innovations; they must, however, be re-educated by the workers, peasants, and soldiers and thoroughly change their ideology. . . .³¹

It was made evident that the "integration" called for was a physical as well as a mental process. Throughout the fall of 1968, intellectuals and students were urged with greater intensity than ever to go to rural areas and "settle down" permanently to become peasants, and reports indicated that many tens of thousands of students were included among those sent out. At the end of the year, Mao made his wishes in this regard even more specific when he issued still another personal instruction:

It is very necessary for educated young people to go to the countryside to be re-educated by the poor and lower-middle peasants. Cadres and other city people should be persuaded to send their sons and daughters who have finished junior or senior middle school, college, or university to the countryside. . . .³²

The impression conveyed by the mass media in China during autumn 1968 was thus one of a massive shuffle of people, with great numbers of young people going to farms and factories at the same time as large contingents of workers and peasants entered the Nation's schools and colleges to take over their management.

Particularly in colleges, the task of the Propaganda Teams was not easy, as their presence was often resented by both teachers and students, who questioned both the need for their intervention and also their

competence to organize and run educational institutions.³³ Both passive and active resistance to their efforts was reported, but official accounts indicated that over a period of several months they gradually restored order by weeding out recalcitrants, patching up what the regime referred to as "bourgeois factionalism in the revolutionary ranks," and subjecting all remaining students and teachers to another round of intensive study of Mao's writings.

A New Look Begins To Emerge

While the workers' Propaganda Teams were taking charge of urban schools and colleges, representatives of the poorer peasant ranks were assuming direction of rural schools in accordance with Mao's instruction of late August. One result of their activities was given prominent publicity in mid-September in an account of the establishment, in one rural area, of a 9-year primary-secondary system in which the school program stressed Mao's writings and practical training and allowed as much time for farm work. This account was followed in October and November by a long series of articles in the *Jen Min Jih Pao*.³⁴

The *Jen Min Jih Pao* series presented examples of the way in which schools were then being run in various parts of rural China. The examples were disparate in nature and did not present a uniform pattern. Relatively little detail was provided concerning the curriculum content in these schools. One of the more specific accounts told of a 2-year half-time school at the junior middle level that offered five courses: Political study, military training, general education, farm skills, and productive labor. Political study, consisting mainly of reading Mao's works, memorizing his "Quotations," and discussing his "instructions," was described as the "main course." For military training the students joined with local militia units. In the farm skills course the students learned how to cultivate the main local crops and gained an elementary understanding of farm machinery and scientific agricultural practices; they applied this knowledge in the labor period. The "general education" component in the curriculum was described as follows:

In general education the students join with the young people in the production brigade to organize groups for newspaper reading, broadcasting, and propaganda work. They undertake joint cultural and recreational activities, and popularize Mao Tse-tung's thought.³⁵

Accounts of program content at the primary level usually gave even less detail, being confined largely to general statements illustrating the stress placed on the study of Mao's ideas and productive labor.

The articles focused most of their attention on the composition of the student body and teacher ranks, and on the way in which schools were established, financed, and governed. With regard to students, the emphasis was on making schools accessible to children of the poorer elements among the peasantry. This was to be accomplished by such

measures as abolishing entrance examinations and other academic testing, reducing or eliminating fees, and operating schools on a part-time schedule adjusted to the busy and slack seasons in the agricultural year. The selection of middle school students was reportedly based on recommendations initiated by the smallest production units, which weighted political and labor activities more heavily than academic records. The comments on teaching staff almost without exception called for having most instruction done by local personnel—especially the more experienced and progressive individuals among the peasantry.

This emphasis on local resources also dominated the discussion of methods of governance and finance. In most cases the primary schools covered in these accounts were run by "production brigades" (a collective unit consisting of several rural villages). Within the production brigade, schools were managed by committees led by representatives of the poorer peasants. The brigade also took over the financing of the schools, which previously had been funded at least in part from central Government revenues. In doing so, it assumed the obligation for meeting teachers' salaries and other expenses out of the collective income. Schools established on this basis, offering courses ranging from 5 to 7 years in duration, were reported by brigades in several parts of the country. Further educational opportunities were provided in some rural areas by a 2-year school most often located only at the level of the commune, a collective unit consisting of several dozen villages or two to three thousand households.

In early December the scope of the *Jen Min Jih Pao* articles was broadened to include ideas and examples concerning how urban primary and middle schools should be operated.³⁶ Like the series on rural schools, but to an even greater degree, this group of articles concentrated on the question of the most appropriate way to establish and control urban schools, and gave few details regarding their study program. Some contributors to the series felt that urban schools should be established and operated by factories; others argued that they should be set up and run by neighborhood groups; and still others saw advantages in joint control by both types of bodies. An editorial comment in the newspaper at the end of the year seemed to indicate a slight preference for governance by neighborhood groups, but it was also evident that all urban schools would, wherever possible, maintain close relations with factories that could provide convenient sites for the productive labor required of their students.

Accounts concerning urban schools continued into 1969, but they were overshadowed at the beginning of the new year by extensive reportage on the exodus of "educated youths" going to the country to be "re-educated" by living and working with the peasants—a movement which reached a new level of intensity after Mao's personal order at the end of December. The mass media featured many stories on groups of thousands of young people departing for rural areas. By May 4 the off-

cial New China News Agency reported that several million middle school and college graduates had made the move since late December.³⁷

While this massive migration from cities was in high gear, the shape of the new school system emerging in urban areas began to come into somewhat sharper focus. Although much diversity was still evident in the publicized examples, the trend toward having primary schools run by neighborhood groups rather than factories became more definite. On the middle school level, the relationship to factories remained a close one, but there was a tendency for schools to be linked simultaneously to other units, as well as to factories.

This idea was given special publicity in late January 1969 when the authoritative Party theoretical journal *Hong Chi* (Red Flag) published its first article on an urban middle school since the beginning of the active discussion period several months earlier. The article was particularly noteworthy in that it presented more concrete details on the school than had appeared in any previous account of an institution at that level. As described in this important article, the leadership group of the school was headed by the top official at a factory and included Army representatives as well as students and teachers. The school had important links to a nearby agricultural commune and to a military unit in the vicinity, as well as to the factory. The students worked in groups, by rotation, in either the commune or the factory for 2 days each week, and attended class for 4 days. The 24 class periods each week included 12 devoted to study of Mao's thought and the history of the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party. Four periods per week were devoted to studying "fundamental lessons in industrial work" while the students were working in the factory, and to a parallel course on farm work while they were working in the commune. The "fundamentals" courses included Mao's writings on industry and agriculture, Party policies and exemplary models in these fields, the basic and applied aspects of mathematics and science related to industry and agriculture, and also such subjects as technology, economic geography, meteorology, and agricultural accounting. Another four periods were devoted to the study of "revolutionary literature and art," a course covering the regime's policies in the cultural field as expounded in Mao's writings and other Party documents, and also including some Chinese language study. Two periods in the study program were allotted to military training and physical education, and involved not only drills and exercises but also study of Mao's ideas on war and military affairs. The remaining two periods were left flexible for unspecified activities. The duration of the program, which covered both junior and senior middle levels, totaled 4 years (2 at each level), as compared with the old middle school program of 6 years. The teaching force for this school with a student body of over 1,600 consisted of 21 of its former teachers (out of a total of 59—the rest were said to have been sent out to do

manual labor), plus 16 workers and peasants (of whom 4 taught full time, and the remainder part time), 2 soldiers, and 1 technician.³⁵

The specific reference, in the account just cited, to the fact that some study of the sciences (physics, chemistry, and biology) was included in the middle school curriculum (even though they were not given the status of separate courses) was not without significance, as explicit references to such subjects had been noticeably absent from most of the earlier reports on middle schools.

The implication that the regime's attitude toward the more traditional types of educational content might be changing was further reinforced by two other articles in *Hung Chi* during the same period. One item, published in the same issue as the article on the urban middle school just referred to, dealt with the problem of the ideological reform of intellectuals—particularly the teachers in colleges and universities. The article was moderate in tone, and stressed that with firm but patient guidance the great majority of intellectuals could reform themselves and continue to render useful service. The other article, which appeared in the March 1969 issue, constituted more striking evidence of a shifting official attitude. The article acknowledged that "a number of people" had been influenced by the argument that book learning was useless since even university graduates would end up doing manual labor. It admitted that the contention that it was pointless to study had led some students to refuse to go to school. In refuting this idea, the article attributed it to people who still thought of book learning only as a path to privileged official positions, rather than as preparation for service to the people. It went on to assert that the country's development required "cultural and scientific knowledge" and that intellectual or academic education, and even exercises and "homework," were still important. Summing up, the article put its case succinctly:

"Moral education" is none other than political ideological education. It stands in the leading position . . . Intellectual development is secondary, but necessary.³⁶

The Reconstruction Effort Gathers Momentum

These partial modifications of the regime's attitude toward intellectuals and academic study presumably reflected the Maoist leadership's growing awareness that its earlier strictures regarding both teachers and students had produced widespread demoralization in their ranks. This demoralization and the passivity that it engendered posed critical problems at a time when the authorities were once again ready to move from the "struggle and criticism" phase of the educational revolution to the phase of "transformation" and the fleshing out of a new school system. Particularly in colleges, the Propaganda Teams, which had served as a useful instrument for directing the last stage of the dismantling of the old institutional structure and the banishment of stubborn bourgeois

professors and unruly extremist students, now needed real help in the more complicated task of establishing a viable alternative system.

Even at this point, nearly 3 years after college classes were suspended and on the eve of the long-delayed Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (which was finally held in early April 1969 to hail the conclusion of the most active phase of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution), the Maoist leadership had apparently still not decided definitively on the details of a new higher education system. This indecision was illustrated by a new series of comments and suggestions in the *Jen Min Jih Pao* that began at the end of March. The series was entitled "How Should Socialist Universities Be Run?" It was introduced with an editor's note saying that although Mao's "great directive" of the previous July had pointed out the "major direction" in which the educational revolution in the universities should move, there were still many "specific problems" pertaining to their operation that remained to be solved. The note ended by inviting the submission of views for publication and discussion.⁴⁰

Several groups of articles in the new series were published at intervals from late March to mid-May. Most items were submitted by the Propaganda Teams at various universities, or by workers or soldiers serving with these Teams; and they proved to be still preoccupied with establishing the general point that colleges and universities should center their curriculum on the writings of Mao Tse-tung and should derive their leadership, their student body, and their teaching force directly from the ranks of workers and peasants. Students would be recommended by workers and peasants; they would attend college for a maximum of 3 years, spending much of their time in general labor or in work connected with the specialties in which they were being trained; and then, after being evaluated by other working-class representatives, they would usually be returned to assignments in their original units.

One of the more unusual aspects of these early commentaries in the series was that several pertained to the future of the "comprehensive universities" (the term used in China to designate institutions that have broad offerings in the humanities, liberal arts, and social sciences as well as the natural sciences). Little had been said about this category of institution since the early days of the Cultural Revolution. One article on such a university in the new series said that in its program of studies Mao's writings would be "basic teaching materials," and "class struggle" would be the "main course." Another item said that courses in liberal arts should include five elements: (1) Mao's writings, (2) the history of the Chinese Communist Party, (3) basic writing techniques, (4) basic agricultural and industrial production knowledge, and (5) military training.

During early 1969 there had been relatively little material in the mass media concerning rural schools, which had been the topic of the first round of open press discussion the previous fall. But in mid-May, as the

new series of proposals on higher education was developing, a document appeared which seemed to represent something of a summation and synthesis of the emerging new look in rural education. The new document, published in the *Jen Min Jih Pao* on May 12, was a program for rural primary and middle schools. It had originally been drawn up by the revolutionary committee of a county in northeast China, but was said to have been revised by the Party newspaper's editors before publication. It was presented as being only a draft proposal for discussion purposes, but its formal organization (in 30 "Articles"), length, and detail were exceptional and contributed further to giving the item an unusually authoritative appearance.⁴¹

Under the program outlined in this document, primary schools would be established in every production brigade, and middle schools would be set up in at least every commune and at lower levels where possible. School expenses would be borne mainly by the collective unit in which they were established, but with the assistance of some unspecified subsidies from higher governmental levels. Management of the schools would be firmly in the hands of the peasantry, whose representatives would act under the general leadership and guidance of the revolutionary committees and Party organs of the rural collectives.

The total duration of primary and middle schooling under this plan would be 9 years, with the divisions between primary and secondary levels to be decided on the basis of local conditions and needs. The curriculum at the primary school level would consist of five courses: (1) politics and language, (2) arithmetic, (3) revolutionary literature and art, (4) military training and physical culture, and (5) productive labor. At the middle school level there would also be five courses: (1) Mao Tse-tung's thought (including modern and contemporary Chinese history and Party history), (2) basic agricultural knowledge (including mathematics, physics, chemistry, and economic geography), (3) revolutionary literature and art (including "language"), (4) military training and physical culture (including Mao's ideas on war and the importance of military preparedness), and (5) productive labor.

Political courses were expressly stated to be the most important at both school levels, but the time allotted to the study of "general knowledge and culture" was set at about 60 percent of the periods in the middle school curriculum and at least 70 percent at the primary level. The amount of time to be spent in productive labor classes was not spelled out, but schools were enjoined to establish sites and facilities where students could engage in farmwork and other rural sideline occupations, the income from which would go to the collective bodies responsible for the school. Apart from the labor included in the class schedule, students would also be expected to participate in the regular work of the collective units of which their families were members.

As outlined in the draft, the student body for these rural schools would be chosen through a system of "recommendation and selection"

for which details were not elaborated. After completing their studies, most of the graduates would continue to work in the countryside. The teaching force would consist of the reformed individuals among the previous teachers, plus new recruits from the ranks of the peasants, demobilized soldiers, and selected "educated young people" who had been sent down to the rural areas to work. Teaching materials should include locally compiled material conforming to local needs as well as texts "compiled by the State." A variety of teaching methods should be used, including instruction both in the classroom and on the work sites, in order to combine theory and practice. Students should teach each other and engage in self-study and discussions, but would also be required to do homework and to subject themselves to tests and examinations.

In sum, the May 1969 proposal concerning rural schools seemed to adopt a relatively moderate position, as illustrated particularly by its explicit assertion that "general knowledge and culture" would still account for 60 to 70 percent of class time, and its open endorsement of testing procedures. This tendency to reconsider some aspects of more traditional educational content and practices was reflected in other published material pertaining to the lower schools during the next several months. For example, the *Ten Min Jih Pao* in June and July carried several comments by workers, soldiers, and students on whether the study of foreign languages should be continued in lower schools. The majority of these comments favored retention of such courses at the middle school level, and some even suggested that they might be taught in primary schools as well, particularly in border and seacoast areas where there was more contact with foreigners.

The question of whether or not the students' achievements in study should be examined in some formal way was the subject of a group of comments in the *Ten Min Jih Pao* on June 11, and again most of the suggestions supported the necessity of having some kinds of tests and examinations in both primary and middle schools. Some of the suggested testing procedures included rather elaborate safeguards for the students. For example, two peasants on the management committee of a rural village school described their school's system as follows:

The method . . . we have adopted is: The questions are to be decided by the teachers and students together, and are made known to the students beforehand. [During the test] the students are allowed to copy each other's answers, to hold discussions, and to look up reference materials. The method of giving marks . . . is: First, the proletarian politics is brought to the fore. Second, when the teacher corrects the answer paper, the student may take part in the correcting and is permitted to put forward suggestions. Third, when the answer papers have been corrected, a draft list of the marks given is prepared and . . . the students' opinions are solicited.⁴²

While the meaningfulness of such an examination system may be questioned, it should be remembered that earlier published references to

testing had often given the impression that it would be entirely dispensed with.

Another indication of the more moderate and traditional approach to subject matter study emerging during this period is to be found in the emphasis placed on theoretical courses during a press discussion of the need for technical schools at the secondary level in August and September. Also in that latter month, the *Jen Min Jih Pao* published a strong comment from a middle school in Shanghai arguing that science courses such as physics and chemistry should be taught at that level as separate courses, rather than as a part of courses in basic industrial or agricultural knowledge.⁴³

These comments on middle schools were among the relatively few items on the lower school levels to appear in the mass media during the second half of 1969, as the focus of major attention returned once again to higher education. The expressions of opinion on the operation of universities that the *Jen Min Jih Pao* had solicited in late March continued to appear in groups of articles published at more or less regular intervals during the summer and fall, and were supplemented by other similar items not included in the special series.⁴⁴

The majority of these new commentaries and reports (like those published earlier in the year) continued to be written by members of the Propaganda Teams stationed in the universities, rather than by either students or faculty members, and, like the earlier articles, they stressed activities and achievements in ideological reform, rather than curricular changes. A new reason for continuing this emphasis was found in the steadily accumulating evidence that many teachers and professors had become demoralized to the point where they were reluctant to participate in efforts to work out new educational programs. Articles published in this period contained frequent references to faculty members who felt that teaching had become an unfortunate and ill-fated profession. This attitude, which was apparently quite prevalent despite the softening in 1969 of the regime's policy toward intellectuals, constituted a direct parallel to the earlier reported feeling among many students that it was useless to study. Taken together, these reactions impeded the formulation of solutions to many concrete academic problems.

In this situation, much of the activity undertaken by the Propaganda Teams and Revolutionary Committees in the universities consisted of sending representative groups from the institutions to visit factories and agricultural collectives to talk with workers and peasants and try to derive from these investigations ideas for restructuring higher education. These exploratory investigations resulted in many disparate suggestions, but a few common features also gradually emerged.

One of the most prevailing themes was that colleges should be relocated so that they could be better related to the fields in which they specialized. Agricultural colleges, for instance, should be located in

farming localities only, and forestry colleges should be moved to wooded areas. In medical education, concerning which there was considerable discussion at this time, the stress was also on moving to rural areas. There the institutions would focus on combining the techniques of Chinese and Western medicine and using them to prevent and treat the common diseases in the countryside, while at the same time training large numbers of paramedical workers for village clinics through short-term courses. In line with this approach, engineering colleges should also be linked closely with the main industries they serve. According to the reports, the precise way in which this linkage was being accomplished varied from institution to institution, however. In some instances factories actually established colleges within their walls. This was the system, for example, at the Shanghai Machine Tools Plant; it established a "July 21 Workers University" in commemoration of the date on which Mao had lauded it a year earlier. In other instances a factory or a group of factories in one field of industry took over the management of an existing college. In still other cases a college or university set up a small factory on its campus. Apparently some difficulties were encountered in establishing good working relationships; the last group of articles in the *Jen Min Jih Pao* series in the fall of 1969 was introduced by an editor's note acknowledging that the question of how to arrange an appropriate type of linkage with a factory had yet to be adequately resolved.

Defining the Limits of Change

The shape of the emerging new higher education system remained in the forefront of attention into the early months of 1970, when for the first time since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution discussion centered on the question of reforms in the collegiate liberal arts programs. Consideration of this topic was launched by an article in the January 1 issue of the important Party journal *Hung Ch'i*, and was continued at an intensive level in the mass media for several weeks thereafter. The tone of the discussion was set by *Hung Ch'i* when it condemned most of the old-style study of liberal arts as useless and said that the proper role of institutions having courses in these fields was to offer study of the works of Marx, Lenin, and Mao and to train "revolutionary troops for the propagation of Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Tse-tung thought."⁴⁵

Subsequent articles in other periodicals carried this narrow concept further, in several instances advocating conversion of the former arts colleges into ill-defined "writing groups" that would concentrate their attention, at least initially, on criticizing and repudiating the bourgeois revisionists whose ideas allegedly had previously dominated institutions of this type. The details as to how such a drastic transformation was to be brought about were never spelled out, and advocacy of these meas-

tures was not continued after a relatively brief but intensive period of initial publicity. One can only speculate as to why the proposal was dropped so abruptly. Opposition to it by faculty members was acknowledged in a number of the articles endorsing the scheme, but it is probably more likely that intervention by the more moderate members of the ruling group in Peking, who may have been reluctant to go quite so far in dismantling the academic institutional structure, was a more important factor in the situation.

The possibility that the extremity of the January proposals had provoked a conservative reaction is further suggested by the appearance, in late February and March, of several articles in *Hung Ch'i* restating in various ways the generally more conciliatory attitude toward intellectuals that had emerged during the previous year. Two of the articles were in the February issue of the journal. One amounted to a fairly comprehensive updating of the regime's policy toward the intellectuals, taking the stance that most members of the intelligentsia were capable of reforming themselves if given adequate time and sufficient consideration. It also offered one very important specific redefinition of the regime's policies: whereas for the previous several years, students and other intellectuals sent to rural areas had been told to "settle down" there (and it had often been made explicit that this meant for the rest of their lives), the new article advanced the idea that a stay of 2 to 3 years could be called "settling down," and even hinted that a shorter sojourn might be considered sufficient in some cases. This modification may have been an important gesture aimed at countering feelings of dejected hopelessness that were apparently widespread among intellectuals at that time. The prevalence of this demoralization was acknowledged again, explicitly, in the other article in the February issue of the same journal. It told how teachers in one secondary school had been helped to overcome their feeling that it was a "misfortune" and "dangerous" to be a teacher. The article included reassurances that substantive knowledge in a field should not be overlooked, that practice could not be substituted for theory, and that the present teachers should not be cast aside. A third article in the same high-level journal a month later, under the title "The Proletarian Revolution in Education Has a Great Future—Refuting the Theory 'There is No Future for a Teacher,'" also faced up directly to the existence of disillusionment among the Nation's teaching force.¹⁶

These gestures were apparently intended to be conciliatory, but it should be emphasized that they were not being made at the sacrifice of what the regime perceived to be its basic ideological position on educational matters. One of the two previously mentioned articles in the February 1970 issue of *Hung Ch'i*, for example, insisted that political education be injected into, and integrated with, all middle school subjects. The article was explicit, allowing little room for misunderstanding:

In the past, some people said that cultural courses were for learning cultural knowledge.

Apparently, bringing proletarian politics to the fore was exclusively a matter for the political courses, and it was both unnecessary and impossible to bring politics to the fore in the cultural courses, especially in mathematics, physics, and chemistry. This point of view is clearly wrong. Chairman Mao teaches us: "All work in school is for changing the thinking of the student." In school, not only political activities and manual labor are aimed at changing a student's thinking, but also all cultural courses—including mathematics, physics, and chemistry—are, without exception, primarily aimed at [this goal]. In fact, there is absolutely no such thing as a "pure" cultural course divorced from politics. In any department or course there is always a guiding thought [ideology] that plays a dominant part. Either proletarian politics or bourgeois politics is brought to the fore—it has to be one or the other.⁴⁷

The article went on to give an illustration of a recommended pedagogical technique, taken from the field of mathematics:

For instance, one teacher, when teaching . . . the mathematical concepts of positive and negative numbers, took as an example China—which has now been freed from debts, both at home and abroad—and collected some relevant data to show that income exceeded expenditure in China's budget. The excess amount is a positive number, which is represented by the "plus" sign . . . U.S. imperialism, on the other hand, because of oppression at home and aggression abroad, is in debt for hundreds of billions of dollars, both at home and abroad. The excess of expenditure over income . . . [is a] negative amount [and] is represented by the "minus" sign . . . The teacher drew the signs on the blackboard to carry out the comparison, and thus not only caused the students to grasp more quickly the concept of positive and negative numbers but also caused them to understand more deeply the incomparable wisdom of Chairman Mao's assertion that "the enemy rots with each passing day, while for us things are getting better every day. . . ." ⁴⁸

In this way the primacy of the political approach and political material in the curriculum was once again restated. It should also be noted, in this connection, that in refuting the idea that there was no future in teaching, the March *Hung Chi* article's basic position was that if any teacher felt that way about his profession, it was because he had not yet rid himself of his bourgeois attitude and perspective. Thus the conciliation offered by the regime was within a carefully restricted scope that in its view did not compromise its main principles.

During the balance of spring and early summer of 1970 there was a relative lull in the discussion of education in mainland publications. Items on higher education in particular fell off markedly from the relatively high level of attention maintained over the previous 12-month period. Such accounts as were released stressed that college students were learning by working under the tutelage of workers and peasants at farms and factories run by, or affiliated with, their institutions. In some instances a single college was said to have established several different factories manned by student labor. One of the more interesting items published in this period was an early May report that students and teachers of both Peking University and Tsinghua University, the

Nation's best-known institutions of higher learning, were tempering themselves through labor on a large farm they had carved out in a remote area of Kiangsi Province, far from Peking. The report, coming nearly 4 full years after college classes were originally interrupted in the spring of 1966, served as a striking reminder that even after this long hiatus normal educational activities had not yet been resumed on the country's major campuses.

The Continuing Search for New Solutions

The lull in attention to education was broken abruptly, and resoundingly, in late July 1970, when the Party magazine *Hung Ch'i* came out with a special number devoted entirely to education—the first issue solely on this topic that it had ever published. Although it contained several articles on other levels and types of schooling, the journal (whose release was timed for the second anniversary of Mao's important July 1968 pronouncement) featured two items on the new look in science and engineering colleges. These were the only items on higher education in the magazine (an editor's note stated explicitly that the reform of liberal arts colleges was a subject that still needed further consideration), and it was clear from the accompanying editorial comments and the nationwide publicity subsequently given them that the two articles were intended to represent a summation of the regime's ideas on higher technological education as they had evolved up to that time.⁴⁰

One of the featured articles was written by the Mao Tse-tung Thought Propaganda Team at Tsinghua University, the first such Team to be organized in 1968 and the contributor of frequent earlier commentaries. The other article was in an unusual format; it was a verbatim report on a roundtable forum discussion of science and engineering colleges in which two Politburo members and a sizable group of representatives from nine colleges and universities in the Shanghai area participated.

The pattern of technological education outlined in these documents was designed to combine closely the functions of teaching, production, and research. Diverse forms of organization, including universities run by factories and factories operated by universities, were allowable, but the emphasis was on having colleges establish one or more factories of their own, and at the same time establish links with other factories whose products were related to the college's specialties. Colleges would generally admit students who were about 20 years old, had the equivalent of at least a junior middle school education, and had worked for a minimum of 3 years before their selection, although age and educational requirements would be waived for experienced older workers and peasants. The regular course of study would last for 2 or 3 years, but there would also be additional "advanced classes" of about 1 year's duration and the institutions would be expected to offer "scientific research classes, spare-time university classes and short-term training

classes on special subjects." The specific courses that should be offered were not mentioned in the *Hung Chi* articles, but it was indirectly indicated that they would include at least some theoretical as well as practical and applied content.

In addition to giving this updated outline of the shape of the new-style technological institutions, the two articles in the Party journal included a number of comments that left a careful reader with a pair of very interesting impressions. One of these impressions, conveyed particularly in the Tsinghua article, was of a further development of the trend toward moderation and conciliation in dealing with the majority of the "old" intellectuals remaining on college faculties. The stress was on patiently assisting these individuals to complete their ideological reform while continuing to utilize their expertise. The usefulness of this expertise was acknowledged in more specific terms than had been used in mainland publications since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Even recourse to "foreign books and reference material" as a legitimate way to maintain one's specialization was explicitly sanctioned—a position in marked contrast to earlier criticisms which had seemed to consider any use of foreign sources as suspect.

The other noteworthy impression conveyed by these articles did not relate to furthering an already existing trend, but rather to emergence of a new and striking factor in the situation. This new factor, which was reflected particularly in the report on the Shanghai forum, was that some colleges had been experimenting with trial programs for workers and peasants, and had encountered some distressing difficulties in dealing with this new kind of student. Part of the problem was that promising potential candidates from the ranks of the workers and peasants sometimes proved reluctant to become students, for reasons that were not spelled out in detail but apparently had something to do with hesitancy about exchanging a status that was held in high regard for one whose desirability had become questionable. But the aspect of the emerging situation clearly of greatest concern to the regime was that some of the newly recruited working-class students felt that they did not need to spend much time on political education and productive labor training, and should be allowed to concentrate most of their attention on technical studies. In short, these new students felt that their backgrounds had made them "already Red," and that therefore the primary purpose of their admission to higher education institutions was to enable them to upgrade their specialized knowledge.

While this attitude might seem reasonable to an outside observer, it was not in accordance with the views of Mao and his colleagues, who have consistently taken the position that even working-class individuals need constant reinforcement of their ideological orientation. To relax political instruction and manual labor requirements for worker and peasant students would, in this conception, risk a serious danger that these students, like their predecessors, would emerge from their training

with nonproletarian values and aspirations. This was a prospect that could not be accepted by the Maoist leadership with equanimity, and the two articles in *Hong Chi* made it plain that the new-style students could not expect to be exempted from programs designed to ensure that their class identification was maintained.

Despite this rather disturbing evidence that limiting attendance largely to workers and peasants might not in itself eliminate all the attitudinal weaknesses it had ascribed to earlier college students, the regime nevertheless decided to move ahead to the next stage in rebuilding the country's system of higher education. This stage involved the long-delayed restocking of the pipeline for training higher level manpower.

Beginning in late summer of 1970, a number of colleges and universities announced that for the first time in 4 years they were admitting a new contingent of regular students. Among the first to enroll new students and resume classes were Peking University and Tsinghua University in the Nation's capital. Together, the two large institutions were reported to have admitted about 4,800 new students,⁵⁰ approximately what their combined annual intake would have been before the Cultural Revolution, when total enrollment at the two schools was around 20,000. During the fall and on through the winter, other colleges and universities gradually resumed regular classes, but in most cases the number of new entrants in individual institutions was not indicated. By the end of the 1970-71 school year the following summer, about 100 colleges, most of them specializing in technological, medical, and agricultural training or in teacher preparation, had been identified as reopening—a substantial number, but only a minor fraction of the 600 to 700 higher education institutions believed to have existed before the Cultural Revolution.⁵¹

The new college students were selected through a process that begins when a unit such as a commune or factory is invited to propose candidates for higher education. The ensuing procedure is described as consisting of four stages, starting with voluntary applications by individuals. The various applications are considered in open meetings in the applicant's working unit, and an eventual "recommendation by the masses" emerges. These recommendations are subject to "approval by the leadership" of the working unit and higher bodies. The final stage in the process is "examination" or "investigation," by the receiving educational institution, of the various prospects brought to its attention. Although the manner in which the critical final stage in the process is implemented was not detailed, this form of explanation indicated for the first time that the institutions would have a definite, and presumably major, role in final selection of their students.

Another point regarding the selection process that received considerable attention at this time was a specific assurance that "educated youths" who had earlier been sent to rural work and had performed

well during an extended period of peasant tutelage were eligible to apply for college entrance. Considered in conjunction with the assignment of a specific recruitment role to college authorities, this provision suggested that the selection system might be moving toward paying more attention to the academic backgrounds of prospective students. But the composition of the new student body, where it was revealed, did not reflect any immediate alteration in the practice of giving preferential treatment to aspirants from the working class. Tsinghua University's new entering class, for example, was reported to be made up of 15 percent workers, 40 percent peasants, and 15 percent military personnel.⁵²

Selection of the new "worker-students" was portrayed in the Chinese media with considerable fanfare. There were accounts of emotional ceremonies in which the chosen ones received simple gifts of peasant hats, straw sandals, hoes, and other such items to take with them to college as constant reminders of the humble circumstances from which they came and the class whose interests they were to serve. After the presentation ceremonies, groups of selectees, often dressed in working clothes, pledged themselves to be worthy of the honor bestowed upon them and departed, sometimes walking on foot for appreciable distances, to take up residence on a college campus. Among those reported to be leaving for Tsinghua University was a man identified as an "aged worker" who had never been to school; another new student was a young girl who took a "solemn oath" before a picture of Chairman Mao just before departing for Peking:

It is my mother who conceived me and gave me birth. Mao Tse-tung's invincible thought which guides me, and the poor and lower-middle peasants who re-educated me. I'll let the Party order my whole life and vow to fight all my life for communism.⁵³

Despite elaborate pledges of this kind from new students, the authorities seem to have continued to be nervous about the firmness of their dedication. Throughout the 1970-71 school year the media devoted considerable attention to the problem posed by sizable numbers of worker-students who felt they were already so thoroughly committed that they didn't need much further political education. The depth of the regime's worries about individuals who saw themselves as "already Red enough" was reflected in the fact that articles in two successive issues of *Hung Ch'i* in February and March 1971 took particular pains to discuss this new concern.⁵⁴

Although the new problem received special attention, the regime also continued its efforts to deal with one that had surfaced somewhat earlier and was apparently still impeding resumption of normal school activities. This was the problem posed by students and teachers (or prospective members of these two groups) who were continuing to question the value of studying and pursuing teaching careers. With regard to both

groups, the source of such negative attitudes was ascribed in the official press to ideological deficiencies, and was made the basis for regular reminders of the need for further improvements in this area, particularly among college-level teachers.

Other educational developments during the 1970-71 school year generally followed the trends that had been gradually emerging during the earlier stages of the reconstruction period. Reports of schools and colleges establishing farms and factories as bases for student labor continued to appear in significant numbers, but they were balanced by periodic warnings against overemphasis of practical and labor training. Such warnings were often coupled with positive statements regarding the value of theoretical and cultural studies, but the liberalizing effect of these references was somewhat blunted by repeated insistence that political content should be injected into the subject-matter of all courses. The impression conveyed by these developments was of a continuing search for a viable compromise preserving a prescribed place for cultural and theoretical education within a framework emphasizing political and practical training.

The fact that other aspects of the new system were also still under active discussion was confirmed unmistakably in another special issue of *Hung Ch'i*, devoted mainly to education, that was published in June 1971.⁵⁵ In an introductory note, the Party journal editor spoke of the educational revolution as a continuing phenomenon. He said that interference with it from both conservatives and ultra-leftists had yet to be entirely overcome, and that a number of important "relationships"—such as the relationship between political and vocational studies, between local and central financing, and between quantitative expansion and qualitative improvement—had yet to be worked out in final form.

All indications suggest that the process of surmounting opposition from critics on both extremes and establishing a new pattern of relationships is still under way, and may not be culminated for some time—it indeed such persistent problems, which in their essence are not unique to China, are ever susceptible to complete resolution.

III. MAJOR FEATURES OF THE EMERGING SYSTEM

Although many details of the new educational system are still to be worked out, and an active period of experimentation is still continuing, the basic conformation and principal characteristics of the system developing in the wake of the Cultural Revolution are discernible.

Perhaps the most important point to make about the new system is that it is highly decentralized and diversified. Both the authority and the responsibility for establishing and maintaining schools at the primary and secondary levels are now largely delegated to localities, where the actual setting up and operation of institutions are undertaken mainly by collective bodies such as agricultural communes or their subdivisions in the countryside, or neighborhood associations in the cities. In some instances factories and large commercial establishments may also establish general schools for the children of their employees and others living nearby. The number and type of schools set up, the duration of their courses, and the content of the instructional programs they offer are all matters for local decision, and the central authorities encourage tailoring all schooling arrangements to reflect special local needs.

The governing bodies of individual schools include representatives of the working class and the military services, who participate in developing school policies through their membership in the Propaganda Teams and on the "revolutionary committees" and Party committees that direct the school's work. The latter two leadership organs also include members of the school's professional and nonprofessional staff, and of the student body. In the year or so after the Propaganda Teams were dispatched to the schools in mid-1968, the power of the working-class and military representatives was actively exerted in shaping all aspects of the schools' activities, but more recently these elements seem to have concentrated on ensuring that the school maintained a correct political orientation, and to have exercised only general supervision over day-to-day administration of the instructional program. Since the working class and military representatives are generally local laborers or farmers or members of nearby garrisons, they also exercise their influence to make the schools responsive to local needs and interests.

Relatively little concrete information is available on the details of school funding, but it is apparent that most of the financing of the primary and middle schools must come from the resources of the sponsoring collective bodies—mainly from the welfare funds made up of a

portion of their undistributed income. Capital expenditures for buildings and equipment are kept at a minimal level by having existing structures renovated and simple furnishings constructed by members of the local community, particularly the students and teachers who will be using the facilities. Although the possibility of some subsidies from higher governmental levels to help pay teachers' salaries has been discussed, the greater part of this expense is also clearly met from local resources. In rural areas, teachers are reportedly usually remunerated on the basis of "work points" analogous to the units on which the compensation of other collective farm workers is determined. The number of units allotted to a particular teacher is based on collective discussions, which may take into consideration not only the quantity and quality of work performed but also the political attitudes of the individual being evaluated. In the final analysis, a significant portion of all schooling costs is apparently returned to the sponsoring body in the form of income from marketing commodities produced by students in workshops, small factories, or farms set up by their schools. Although no comprehensive figures covering large areas are available on the magnitude of this contribution, the general impression conveyed by reports in recent years is that these productive activities often are sufficient to defray a major part of a school's operating expenses.

Despite the general localization of the authority and responsibility for establishing, administering, and financing schools, the basic structure of the new school system taking shape in different parts of China varies relatively little from one area to another. Before 1966, the typical full schooling cycle through college or university graduation consisted of 17 school years—6 years at the primary level, 3 at the junior secondary level, 3 at the senior secondary level, and 5 at the higher education level. In response to Mao Tse-tung's call for a shortening of this period, the duration of the total cycle has now been sharply reduced to 11 or 12 years in most instances, although no official national directive to this effect has yet been issued. As most often described, the new pattern consists of 5 years of primary school, 2 of junior middle school, 2 of senior middle school, and a basic college or university course of 2 or 3 years' duration. Especially in rural areas, where the senior secondary level is often available only in larger towns, the primary and junior middle schools are sometimes combined in an uninterrupted 7-year program in one school.

Although this 11- or 12-year cycle represents the basic regular sequential progression from primary through tertiary education, it does not constitute the full range of available levels and types of schooling. There are also kindergartens which accommodate preschool children up to age 7, a number of different kinds of specialized vocational schools at the secondary level, and a great variety of part-time, spare-time, and short-term courses at both secondary and higher education levels.

It is in the area of curriculum content rather than organizational structure that the greatest differences among local school networks seem to exist. Obviously the drastic shortening of the regular schooling cycle and the intensified practical and political emphases have necessitated substantial changes in the courses at all levels, but it is not yet possible to generalize with confidence on the eventual results of the widespread experimentation that is still proceeding in curricular reform. Systematically quantified curriculum tables for primary and middle schools have not become generally available, and published accounts concerning the specific subjects included in curriculums at these levels still show considerable variations. All that can be said with reasonable assurance is that school programs at both levels are built around four common elements: Mao Tse-tung's writings, productive labor, military and physical training, and revolutionary literature and art. At the primary level, pupils are given basic instruction in language and arithmetic, and apparently much of the language training is carried out in conjunction with study of articles and stories by Mao and other revolutionary writers. At the secondary level, the four core elements are supplemented by further studies in Chinese language and mathematics, classroom instruction concerning agricultural and industrial vocations is often added, and specific courses on geography, history, physics, chemistry, and foreign languages (especially English) may be introduced. At this level, teaching in social studies, as well as that in the linguistic area, is coordinated with study of the works of Mao and other socialist authors, and instruction in mathematics and science is closely linked with vocational classes and productive labor activities.

As might be expected, the productive labor courses that constitute a distinctive feature of the new curriculums vary greatly in the time devoted to them and the type of activities they encompass. If one were to generalize on the basis of reportage in recent years on this aspect of the school program, he could identify the activity as usually beginning in earnest at the primary level, where pupils in the lower grades of the regular full-time schools often spend an hour or two a week in workshops or garden plots maintained by the school. The labor time is gradually increased during the primary school years to a level of at least 3 or 4 hours a week for fifth graders. Older primary students may also be required to spend several weeks per year working at collective farms or factories outside the school. In middle schools, students may put in the equivalent of 1 or 2 full days each week at school-run factories or farms, and in addition are commonly asked to spend 2 months a year working at agricultural communes and industrial plants. At the college level, students typically spend one-third or more of their time in productive labor activities, most of it in concentrated periods of one to several months' duration. Those in technical fields usually work at establishments on or off the campus related to the specialties in which they are training, while students in the social sciences and other non-

technical specialties put in their labor time mainly on collective farms. All students are required to do some work in rural areas.

Most workshops set up by primary and secondary schools are reported to be built by the students and teachers themselves, with some help from parents and neighborhood workers, and to be constructed out of scrap metal, lumber, and other salvaged or inexpensive materials available locally. Some of the activity in these workshops, such as that involved in putting together containers for packaging small items manufactured in nearby factories (a typical project for younger children), requires mainly manual work. For other processes, such as making utility furniture and cleaning equipment like brooms and dustpans for use in the schools themselves, only hand tools are necessary. But the reported products of school workshops and small factories are not limited to such simple items. Some of the most frequently mentioned commodities manufactured by primary and middle schools are parts for automotive vehicles, electrical components, and insecticides and fertilizers for agricultural use; goods produced by factories on college campuses include even more sophisticated items, such as pharmaceutical preparations for human consumption.

Workers and technicians from factories located near the schools apparently play an important consultative role in establishing and operating these productive enterprises, and outside industrial installations undoubtedly in many cases help supply school plants with necessary machinery and raw or partially processed materials. In any event, whether the goods produced by school factories are directly marketed as completed items or returned to other factories for final processing or assembly, the school factories receive appropriate monetary compensation for their contribution to the finished product.

Although the productive labor element in the school program at all levels is obviously significant as a means of introducing students to the basic skills and techniques of agricultural and industrial work, it is essential to underline that its primary purpose, in the view of Mao and his colleagues, is not vocational training. Articles on education appearing in Chinese publications frequently make the point that the main aim of productive labor activities in the schools is to engender respect for work (especially manual labor) and appreciation of the importance of the working class. Thus, productive labor activities are designed primarily to supplement political instruction and to contribute to what might be called "attitudinal education"—a concept which is at the heart of the Maoist approach to all work in schools at every level.

Not only has the school curriculum been substantially revised to reflect the new practical-political orientation, but the manner in which a student's performance in that program is evaluated has also been basically changed to fit the new pattern. Prior to 1966, a student's progress up the educational ladder depended primarily on the grades he achieved in vigorous competitive subject matter examinations. This

practice is now held to have contributed to emergence of an elitist educational system in which students from worker and peasant families lost out in the competition. In the new approach a student is assessed not so much in terms of his ability to memorize facts and master abstract theories, but more in terms of the political attitudes he manifests and his ability to work cooperatively with others in applying what he has learned to solving practical problems. In line with this approach, much of the evaluation of an individual's performance is done by his classmates through group discussion, and the role of traditional examinations is drastically reduced. Some subject matter tests are apparently still given, but surprise quizzes are strictly forbidden and most examination questions are announced in advance and answered on an "open book" basis. The test papers, which are also often subjected to group evaluation involving fellow students as well as teachers, are generally not formally graded and are used more to indicate material requiring further clarification than to measure individual achievement.

Academic examinations have reportedly been eliminated entirely from the process by which entrants into the upper levels of the educational system are selected. An individual may not be considered for college admission until he is about 20 years old and has had 2 or 3 years of working experience (military service may be used to fulfill the employment requirement). If he is a young person he must have completed at least a junior secondary level of schooling (ninth grade before 1966, now generally seventh grade), but older workers and peasants may be exempted from all provisions regarding prior schooling. Candidates are nominated by the units in which they work, largely on the basis of their political attitudes and work records, and the screening procedure at higher levels through which the final selection is made is not supposed to include any subject matter testing. This rule is presumably a firm one, since the decision to abolish college entrance examinations because they functioned to exclude worker-peasant students from access to higher education was (as indicated at the beginning of this study) one of the first major moves in the educational revolution in the summer of 1966. The new selection process is consciously designed to enable workers, peasants, and military personnel to enter higher educational institutions even though their formal schooling background is limited, and the composition of the new college entrants in 1970 and subsequently, where it has been reported, reflects a preponderance of these three groups in the student body. After completing their college studies, most of these students are slated to return to service in the units from which they came, but there is a possibility that some will be given other assignments by the state.

The composition of the teaching force, as well as that of the student body, includes active members of the working class. In addition to a staff of full-time professional teachers, schools at all levels utilize the services of workers, peasants, and soldiers, who act as part-time teachers

in labor courses and political classes. Students themselves are also important adjuncts to the teaching force; in some instances they have been reported to have given lectures, but more commonly they are cited for helping each other in individual situations or in supplementary group-study sessions.

IV. SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

In the foregoing pages of this study, an attempt has been made to trace the course of the educational revolution begun at Mao Tse-tung's behest in 1966, and to summarize the basic and distinctive features of the new educational system that is evolving in China in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. In conclusion, it may be appropriate to offer some observations concerning the significance of the new system and its future prospects.

One of the most significant aspects of the new educational system is that it represents a conscious and purposeful effort on a national scale to grant preferential treatment to a class or group—the “workers and peasants”—who are deemed to have been educationally “disadvantaged” in the past. In a world that is currently giving special attention to the problems of the “disadvantaged,” this Chinese experiment (which incidentally deals with a disadvantaged group constituting a majority of the population, rather than a minority) will be closely watched, to see whether it actually achieves the desired uplifting results for the previously underprivileged group, and, if so, whether this goal can be attained without engendering a form of “reverse discrimination” that is so wasteful as to be unacceptable to the society concerned.

Another of the more important features of the new system is its commitment to a drastic reduction in the duration of the schooling cycle from primary school through college. The Chinese authorities have decided that 12 or 13 years of schooling, rather than the previous 17 or more, are sufficient to provide the basic training required for even such exacting professions as medicine and engineering. This innovation too will be carefully examined in the many countries where the lengthy duration and high cost of formal schooling in certain technical and professional fields have been subjected to increasing scrutiny in recent years.

Still another of the more noteworthy aspects of the system now emerging is its emphasis on practical training and vocational experience as a major part of the formal curriculum. Although the Chinese educational system is not alone in placing a high evaluation upon this type of education, it nevertheless represents a virtually unique degree of theoretical commitment to, and actual implementation of, this approach. The results of the Chinese experiment will thus be of great interest to the many countries throughout the world that are actively concerned not only with establishing a proper place and effective ar-

rangements for vocational and career training within their total educational effort, but also with fostering a more widespread appreciation of the work ethic among that portion of the population that has had the advantage of relatively extensive formal schooling.

Other features of the system that are of international significance will be readily apparent to the reader, and need not be enumerated here. But even this suggestive listing of some of the more important aspects of the new system cannot be concluded without calling attention once again to perhaps its most striking characteristic—the prominence of political education at all levels in the school system. This element, which is focused upon avowedly partisan indoctrination, is central to the Maoist approach to education. Despite the negative reactions that the sometimes abrasive argumentation used in this effort elicits among outside observers in the Western democracies, the Chinese approach clearly illustrates one point of view concerning a fundamental question—the appropriate nature and role of moral/spiritual/political values in public education. In essence, it reflects a basic belief, stemming from Mao's ideas, that influencing and shaping attitudes is by far the most important task of teachers and schools. In the Maoist conception, correct *attitudes* (on political and social matters) lead to correct *motivation*, which is even more important than knowledge or skill—in fact, to a certain extent, motivation is even “substitutable” for knowledge and/or skill. In this sense, the Chinese system constitutes a massive experiment testing the efficacy of a pedagogical system stressing inculcation of attitudes, rather than imparting of substantive information.

The significance of some of the major aspects of the emerging revision of the Chinese educational system, as it bears upon educational policy questions under discussion in other parts of the world, is thus clear. But what are the prospects for the new system's success in China? What further changes or modifications in the system may be expected in the coming years? These are highly speculative questions, and, in a system still admittedly in a state of flux and experimentation, definitive answers will be impossible for some time. A few tentative comments may, however, be made at this juncture:

In the first place, the prospects for success or failure of the new educational system must be evaluated in terms of *Chinese* conditions. In other words, the question becomes how appropriate the system is in terms of meeting the needs of China as perceived by that country's leadership, at the stage of development which China has reached in the 1970's.

The essential elements in China's domestic situation at this point in history are that it has a huge population supported by a largely rural agricultural economy, and is in only the early stages of mechanization and industrialization. In other words, China has a relatively abundant supply of labor and a relative shortage of capital. In this situation it is logical for the Chinese to attempt to develop their economy at present

by utilizing large amounts of human labor and minimal amounts of expensive and complicated capital goods such as machinery (i.e., by using "labor-intensive" rather than "capital-intensive" methods).

Under its new educational system, China appears to have opted to focus the bulk of its educational resources on creating a massive human force attitudinally conditioned to hard work and possessing rather modest levels of specialized knowledge and skills, and to be content for the time being with training a much smaller number of highly sophisticated experts than could be developed through alternative resource allocations. This decision is not unreasonable in view of the present conditions in China. The new educational system can very possibly produce the large numbers of skilled and semiskilled laborers, low- and middle-level technicians, and paraprofessionals upon whom the Chinese economy will heavily rely to man its fields, factories, and service establishments for some time to come; and much of the needed high-level human expertise and advanced scientific and technical data and apparatus not available within the country can conceivably be imported for awhile from abroad, if appropriate international relationships are developed and maintained.

But over the longer run it can probably also be safely predicted that, for reasons of pride and national security, if for no others, China will decide it must produce for itself an increasing supply of the top-quality research scientists, engineers, managers, and other professional specialists essential to maintaining a long term modernization program. As the need for expert manpower grows with the attainment of more advanced levels of development, gradual changes in the educational system designed to reflect the new situation can probably be expected to occur.

Indeed, this process of adjustment has apparently already begun; its preliminary steps are detectable in the educational developments since 1969, as recorded earlier in this study. A number of the more radical ideas put forward during the early period of the educational revolution (1966-68) have been gradually modified during the last few years, as the leadership in Peking has become more moderate in orientation. A pair of striking examples of this modification are the partial reinstatement of examination procedures to assess competencies, and the revived importance ascribed to teaching foreign languages (especially English). Both of these post-1968 developments are in marked contrast to the ideas circulated in the early extreme period of the Cultural Revolution, and they have laid the groundwork for a policy shift toward paying renewed attention to elevating qualitative factors and meeting advanced international standards. This shift is developing as China rapidly emerges into broader contact with the rest of the world, and it is likely to become more pronounced as time goes on.

Other gradual modifications in educational policy may also be postulated. For example, providing preferential treatment to prospective

students from "disadvantaged" worker and peasant families should logically, if successful, be only a medium-term "compensatory" program, self-corrective in nature, that can and may be gradually deemphasized, progressively absorbed, and eventually phased out after a substantial but nevertheless delimitable "catchup" period.

Over a longer time, even a considerable modification of the pervasiveness and stridency of partisan political indoctrination in the educational system may occur. As previously emphasized in this study, Chairman Mao and his associates are preoccupied with what they see as the vital task of creating and maintaining a proletarian and collectivist orientation among the Nation's young people. Already there have been clear danger signs in this critical area, and it may yet pose the most serious long-term problem for the regime. In attempting to reestablish constructive morale within the school system after the chaotic period of 1966 to 1968, with its wasteful protracted suspension of normal school functions, the Chinese leaders have had to contend not only with teachers intimidated into passivity and school-age youths who decided it was "useless to study," but also—most recently and most disturbingly—with newly recruited worker-students who felt they were "already Red" and therefore could concentrate most of their attention on technical studies and devote little time to political courses.

These existing attitudinal and motivational problems may be exacerbated, in time, by two additional factors. First, the regime's insistence that political education be injected into all subjects at all levels in the school system may very well prove to be impracticable in the long run. It severely taxes the ingenuity and imagination of teachers and textbook compilers, with the result that some of the illustrations and examples developed under this pressure tend to be either obscure or clumsy and fartetched. To the extent that this is so, indoctrination through such methods may eventually prove to be not only ineffective but even counterproductive.

The second factor that may complicate the motivational problems is more basic. As history indicates and Chairman Mao has already learned from his own experience, the fervor of a revolutionary movement seemingly tends inevitably to subside as the movement becomes consolidated in power and involved in the more routine functions of administrative management. For this reason, there is a real possibility that during the process of conversion of the revolutionary forces into a governing "Establishment," with its attendant privileged bureaucracy, appeals to young persons to "support the revolution" or "serve the people" in ways that are in practice actually dictated by the State and the Establishment, rather than decided upon by individuals, may become progressively less effective. This diminishing effectiveness may eventually reach a point where the necessary motivation can no longer be sustained by a major reliance on political indoctrination. If this situation materializes, the Chinese authorities may be forced in order to maintain the

essential enthusiasm of the young, to gradually fall back upon the dynamics of the human ambition to better one's individual condition. Only time will tell, therefore, whether the Maoist approach will be finally successful in altering traditional attitudes under which education is perceived by most people as being as much a means for personal advancement as it is a preparation for service to society.

NOTES

¹ For a descriptive analysis of the development of educational policy before the Cultural Revolution, see Robert D. Barendsen, "Education in China: A Survey," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. III, No. 4, July-August 1964, pp. 19-27.

² The full text of Mao's May 7 statement was published in the Chinese Communist Party journal *Hung Ch'i* No. 2/1969 (Jan. 27, 1969); it may be found in American Consulate General, Hong Kong, *Selections from China Mainland Magazines* (cited hereafter as SCMM) No. 647 (Mar. 17, 1969), p. 14.

³ In American Consulate General, Hong Kong, *Current Background* (cited hereafter as CB) No. 852 (May 6, 1968), pp. 2-6.

⁴ See Fang Cheng, "Education in Communist China, 1966," in *Communist China, 1966* (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968), Vol. II, pp. 45-58.

⁵ Secondary schools are called "middle schools" in China.

⁶ New China News Agency (NCNA), June 18, 1966; in CB No. 846 (Feb. 8, 1968), p. 1.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-5.

⁸ A representative sample of these statements and comments may be found in American Consulate General, Hong Kong, *Survey of the China Mainland Press* (cited hereafter as SCMP) No. 3724 (June 23, 1966), pp. 2-13, and No. 3748 (July 28, 1966), pp. 12-17.

⁹ In CB No. 852 (May 6, 1968), p. 13.

¹⁰ See CB No. 891 (Oct. 8, 1969), p. 63, and CB No. 863 (Oct. 1, 1968), pp. 4-6.

¹¹ *Jen Min Jih Pao*, Aug. 17, 1966; in SCMP No. 3765 (Aug. 22, 1966), p. 15.

¹² On these developments, see the documents in CB No. 852 (May 6, 1968), pp. 22, 26-27, 34-35, and 122.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55 and 59-60.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

¹⁸ For accounts of some of these struggles, see CB No. 844 (Jan. 10, 1968), *passim*.

¹⁹ See CB No. 863 (Oct. 1, 1968), pp. 13-14.

²⁰ In CB No. 846 (Feb. 8, 1968), pp. 15-17.

²¹ New China News Agency (NCNA), Nov. 5, 1967; in CB No. 846 (Feb. 8, 1968), pp. 29-30.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

²³ *Jen Min Jih Pao*, Nov. 26, 1967; *ibid.*, pp. 41-42.

²⁴ Shanghai radio broadcast, Feb. 6, 1968; in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report, Communist China* (cited hereafter as *DRCC*) No. 28/1968 (Feb. 8, 1968), p. ddd 12.

²⁵ Tillman Durdin dispatch, *New York Times*, Apr. 14, 1968, Sec. IV, p. 4.

²⁶ Agence France Press (AFP) dispatch, *ibid.*, July 8, 1968, p. 2.

²⁷ *Jen Min Jih Pao*, July 22, 1968; in *Chinese Education*, Vol. II, Nos. 1-2 (Spring-Summer 1969), p. 6.

²⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 5-17.

²⁹ *Hung Ch'i*, No. 2/1968 (Aug. 23, 1968); in *Chinese Education*, Vol. II, Nos. 1-2 (Spring-Summer 1969), p. 19.

³⁰ Peking radio broadcast, Sept. 23, 1968; in *DRCC* No. 189/1968 (Sept. 26, 1968), pp. B 5-9.

³¹ Hangchow radio broadcast, Sept. 12, 1968; in *DRCC* No. 182/1968 (Sept. 17, 1968), p. C 14.

³² Peking radio broadcast, Dec. 23, 1968; in *DRCC* No. 250/1968 (Dec. 24, 1968), p. B 1.

¹⁶ In this connection, see an article in *Hung Ch'i*, No. 2, 1968 (Aug. 25, 1968); in *DRCC* No. 167, 1968 (Aug. 26, 1968), pp. B 1-6. Also see a dispatch by Tillman Durdin in the *New York Times*, Sept. 29, 1968, p. 2.

¹⁷ See CB No. 868 (Dec. 31, 1968), and CA No. 869 (Jan. 15, 1969) for these articles.

¹⁸ *Jen Min Jih Pao*, Oct. 23, 1968; in CB No. 868 (Dec. 31, 1968), p. 14.

¹⁹ Selections from the series of articles on urban schools are collected in CB No. 879 (Jan. 27, 1969).

²⁰ See the Editor, "Peking's Program to Move Human and Material Resources to the Countryside," *Current Scene*, Vol. VII, No. 18 (Sept. 15, 1969), p. 15.

²¹ *Hung Ch'i*, No. 2, 1969 (Jan. 27, 1969); in SCMM No. 647 (Mar. 17, 1969), pp. 15-20.

²² *Hung Ch'i*, No. 3-4, 1969 (Mar. 14, 1969); in *Chinese Education*, Vol. I, No. 4 (Winter 1968-69), p. 18.

²³ The early items in this series, published in the spring of 1969, are collected in CB No. 881 (May 26, 1969).

²⁴ See the text of this document in *Chinese Education*, Vol. II, No. 4 (Winter 1969-70), pp. 53-62.

²⁵ *Jen Min Jih Pao*, June 11, 1969; in SCMP No. 4447 (July 2, 1969), p. 9.

²⁶ *Jen Min Jih Pao*, Sept. 22, 1969; in SCMP No. 4510 (Oct. 6, 1969), p. 9.

²⁷ For a collection of these articles see CB No. 890 (Sept. 18, 1969) and CB No. 903 (Mar. 17, 1970). The following discussion is based on this material.

²⁸ *Hung Ch'i* No. 1, 1970 (Jan. 1, 1970); in *Chinese Education*, Vol. III, No. 4 (Winter 1970-71), pp. 195-204.

²⁹ For the two February articles, see SCMM No. 675-77 (Mar. 9-30, 1970), pp. 35-48 and 69-77; the March article is in SCMM No. 678-680 (Apr. 13-27, 1970), pp. 58-62.

³⁰ *Hung Ch'i* No. 3, 1970 (Feb. 28, 1970); in *Chinese Education*, Vol. III, No. 4 (Winter 1970-71), p. 206.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

³² For a complete translation of this special issue of the Party journal, *Hung Ch'i* No. 8, 1970 (July 21, 1970), see SCMM No. 687-88 (Aug. 10-17, 1970); the two articles on higher education are on pp. 1-36.

³³ "China's 'Reformed' Universities: The First Year," *Current Scene*, Vol. IX, No. 6 (June 7, 1971), p. 9.

³⁴ See Appendix A.

³⁵ "China's Academic Reforms: A Progress Report," *Current Scene*, Vol. IX, No. 9 (Sept. 7, 1971), p. 22.

³⁶ *Kuang Ming Jih Pao* (Kuangming Daily), Sept. 21, 1970; in SCMP No. 4752 (Aug. 6, 1970), pp. 40 and 45.

³⁷ See these articles in SCMM No. 699-700 (Mar. 1-8, 1971), pp. 54-59, and SCMM No. 701-02 (Mar. 29-Apr. 6, 1971) pp. 58-63.

³⁸ The articles in this special issue, *Hung Ch'i* No. 6/1971 (June 1, 1971), may be found in SCMM No. 707-08 (June 28-July 6, 1971).

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

This study is based mainly on primary source material, consisting largely of articles from newspapers and journals published in the People's Republic of China. Material of this kind is available in English translation through two major research resources. One is the group of three serials prepared by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong (*Survey of the China Mainland Press*, *Current Background*, and *Selections from China Mainland Magazines*). Collections of these serials may be found in a substantial number of college and public libraries. The other major resource for this material in English translation is the *Daily Report, Communist China* (since Aug. 1, 1971, retitled *Daily Report, People's Republic of China*) prepared by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Collections of this serial are available in a few major college and public libraries. Current issues of all the above-mentioned serials may be obtained on a subscription basis from the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, Va. 22151.

A selection of some of the more important material of the kind represented in these serials may be found in a conveniently accessible form in *Chinese Education*, a quarterly journal of translations published since spring 1968 by the International Arts and Sciences Press (IASP). This journal is included in many library holdings and may be obtained through subscription from the IASP at 901 North Broadway, White Plains, N.Y. 10603.

The most comprehensive bibliography available in this field is Stewart E. Fraser and Kuang-liang Hsu, *Chinese Education and Society, a Bibliographical Guide: The Cultural Revolution and Its Aftermath*, published by IASP in 1972 in book form and also as vol. V, no. 3-4 (Fall-Winter 1972-73) of *Chinese Education*.

APPENDIXES

Appendix A. Number of higher educational institutions of various types in the People's Republic of China: November 1965¹

Type of Institution	Number
Comprehensive Universities [Tsung Ho Ta Hsueh] (including Universities of Science and Technology [K'o Hsueh Chi Shu Ta Hsueh] and Universities of Science and Engineering [Li Kung Ta Hsueh])	43
Higher Technological Schools [Kao Teng Kung Yeh Hsueh Hsiao]	
Comprehensive type [Tsung Ho Lei] (multidepartment technological or engineering colleges and schools)	52
Agricultural and Forestry Mechanization type [Nung Yeh Chi Hsieh, Lin Yeh Chi Hsieh Lei]	10
Cartography and Meteorology type [Ts'e Hui, Ch'i Hsiang Lei]	3
Chemical Engineering type [Hue Kung Lei]	16
Construction Industry and Architectural Engineering type [Chien Chu Kung Yeh, Chien Chu Kung Ch'eng Lei]	11
Electrical Communications type [T'ung Hsin Lei]	13
Geological Survey type [Ti Chih K'an T'an Lei]	8
Light Industry type [Ch'ing Kung Yeh Lei]	13
Machinery and Machine-building type [Chi Ch'i, Chi Hsieh Chuang Tsao Lei]	13
Metallurgy type [Yeh Chin Lei]	17
Mining and Refining type [T'an K'uang, K'uang Yeh Lei]	27
Power and Water Conservancy type [Tung Li, Shui Li Lei]	18
Special Industries type [T'e Tsung Kung Yeh Lei]	6
Transportation and Shipping type [Chiao T'ung Yun Shu Lei]	30
Other types [Ch'i T'a Lei]	7
Total	237
Colleges of Agriculture and Forestry, Animal Husbandry, and Marine Products [Kao Teng Nung Lin, Ch'u Mu, Shui Ch'an Hsueh Yuan]	75
Higher Schools of Medicine and Pharmacy [Kao Teng Yi Yao Hsueh Hsiao]	87
Higher Schools and Colleges of Political Science and Law, Finance, and Economics [Kao Teng Cheng Fa, Ts'ai Ching Yuan Hsiao]	33
Colleges for Minority Nationalities [Min Tsu Hsueh Yuan]	10
Higher Schools and Colleges of Languages [Kao Teng Yu Wen Yuan Hsiao]	14
Higher Schools of the Arts [Kao Teng Yi Shu Hsueh Hsiao]	36
Colleges of Physical Education [Kao Teng Ti Yu Hsueh Yuan]	15
	47

Higher Schools and Colleges of Teacher Training and Education
[Kao Teng Shih Fan, Chiao Yu Yuan Hsiao]

113

Grand Total

663^a

^a Source: Shang Shih, "Mu Ch'ien Ta Lu Te Kao Teng Hsueh Hsiao" (Higher Educational Institutions in Present-day Mainland China), *Tai Kuo* (China Monthly), No. 11 (Nov. 1), 1965, pp. 22-30, and No. 12 (Dec. 1), 1965, pp. 30-34 (in Chinese).

^b No updated comprehensive list of this kind has become available since the Cultural Revolution. The current number of institutions is believed to be drastically reduced from the 1965 total.

^c Of the 663 institutions, 80 are listed in the source as "universities" (*ta hsueh*), including technological universities (*kung shih ta hsueh*); 462 are listed as "colleges" (*hsueh yuan*); 118 are listed as "minor colleges" (*chuan k'o hsueh hsiao*), and 3 are listed as "schools" (*hsueh hsiao*). (For the names of the 80 "universities," see appendix B.)

**Appendix B. Universities in the People's Republic of China, with
location and date of establishment: November 1965 ¹**

[—indicates source gave no date]

University ²	Location	Date of establishment
Comprehensive Universities		
AMOY UNIVERSITY*	Amoy	1921
(Hs'a Men Ta Hsueh)		
ANKHWEI UNIVERSITY *	Wuhu	1958
(An Hui Ta Hsueh)		
CHENGCHOW UNIVERSITY	Chengchow	1956
(Cheng Chou Ta Hsueh)		
CHENG TU UNIVERSITY	Chengtu	—
(Ch'eng Tu Ta Hsueh)		
CHINA UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (Chung Kuo K'o Hsueh Chi Shu Ta Hsueh)	Peking	1958
CHINAN UNIVERSITY	Canton	1958
(Chi Nan Ta Hsueh)		
CHINESE PEOPLE'S UNIVERSITY (Chung Kuo Jen Min Ta Hsueh)	Peking	1950
CHINGHAI UNIVERSITY *	Sining	1960
(Ch'ing Hai Ta Hsueh)		
FOOCHOW UNIVERSITY *	Foochow	1959
(Fu Chou Ta Hsueh)		
FUTAN UNIVERSITY *	Shanghai	1905
(Fu Tan Ta Hsueh)		
HANGCHOW UNIVERSITY *	Hangchow	1958
(Hang Chou Ta Hsueh)		
HEILUNGKIANG UNIVERSITY *	Harbin	—
(Hei Lung Chiang Ta Hsueh)		
HOFEI UNIVERSITY	Hofei	—
(Ho Fei Ta Hsueh)		
HOPEI UNIVERSITY *	Tientsin	—
(Ho Pei Ta Hsueh)		
HUANNAN UNIVERSITY	Wuhu	—
(Hu Nan Ta Hsueh)		
HUNAN UNIVERSITY	Changsha	1959
(Hu Nan Ta Hsueh)		
HUPEI UNIVERSITY	Wuhan	—
(Hu Pei Ta Hsueh)		
INNER MONGOLIA UNIVERSITY (Nei Meng Ku Ta Hsueh)	Huhehot	1957
KIANGSI UNIVERSITY	Nanchang	1958

Comprehensive Universities (Cont.)

(Chiang Hsi Ta Hsueh)		
KIRIN UNIVERSITY	Changchun	before 1957
(Chi Lin Ta Hsueh)		
KWANGSI UNIVERSITY *	Nanning	1958
(Kuang Hsi Ta Hsueh)		
KWEICHOW UNIVERSITY	Kweiyang	1958
(Kuei Chou Ta Hsueh)		
LANCHOW UNIVERSITY *	Lanchow	before 1957
(Lan Chou Ta Hsueh)		
LIAONING UNIVERSITY *	Shenyang	1958
(Liao Ning Ta Hsueh)		
NANCHANG UNIVERSITY	Nanchang	1958
(Nan Ch'ang Ta Hsueh)		
NANKAI UNIVERSITY *	Tientsin	1919
(Nan K'ai Ta Hsueh)		
NANKING UNIVERSITY	Nanking	1902
(Nan Ching Ta Hsueh)		
NANNING UNIVERSITY	Nanning	1958
(Nan Ning Ta Hsueh)		
NINGHSIA UNIVERSITY	Yinchuan	1962
(Ning Hsia Ta Hsueh)		
NORTH CHINA PEOPLE'S UNIVERSITY	Peking	1960
(Hua Pei Jen Min Ta Hsueh)		
NORTHWEST UNIVERSITY *	Sian	before 1957
(Hsi Pei Ta Hsueh)		
OVERSEAS CHINESE UNIVERSITY	Ch'uanchou	1960
(Hua Ch'iao Ta Hsueh)		
PEKING UNIVERSITY *	Peking	1898
(Pei Ching Ta Hsueh)		
SHANGHAI UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY * (Shang Hai K'o Hsueh Chi Shu Ta Hsueh)	Shanghai	1958
SHANSI UNIVERSITY	Taiyuan	1958
(Shan Hsi Ta Hsueh)		
SHANTUNG UNIVERSITY *	Tsinan	1926
(Shan Tung Ta Hsueh)		
SINKIANG UNIVERSITY *	Urumchi	1960
(Hsin Chiang Ta Hsueh)		
SUN YAT-SEN UNIVERSITY *	Canton	1924
(Chung Shan Ta Hsueh)		
SZECHWAN UNIVERSITY	Chungking	1931
(Sze Ch'uan Ta Hsueh)		
WUHAN UNIVERSITY *	Wuchang	1913
(Wu Han Ta Hsueh)		
YENAN UNIVERSITY	Yenan	1958
(Yen An Ta Hsueh)		
YENPIEN UNIVERSITY	Yenki	1949
(Yen Pien Ta Hsueh)		
YUNNAN UNIVERSITY *	Kunming	1922
(Yun Nan Ta Hsueh)		

Technological (or Engineering) Universities

CHEKIANG UNIVERSITY ° (Che Chiang Ta Hsueh)	Hangchow	before 1957
CHUNGKING UNIVERSITY (Ch'ung Ch'ing Ta Hsueh)	Chungking	before 1957
HARBIN INDUSTRIAL UNIVERSITY ° (Ha Erh Pin Kung Yeh Ta Hsueh)	Harbin	before 1957
HOFEI INDUSTRIAL UNIVERSITY ° (Ho Fei Kung Yeh Ta Hsueh)	Hofei	—
KIRIN INDUSTRIAL UNIVERSITY (Chi Lin Kung Yeh Ta Hsueh)	Changchun	1958
LANCHOW INDUSTRIAL UNIVERSITY (Lan Chou Kung Yeh Ta Hsueh)	Lanchow	1958
NORTHWEST INDUSTRIAL UNIVERSITY ° (Hsi Pei Kung Yeh Ta Hsueh)	Sian	1958
PEKING INDUSTRIAL UNIVERSITY ° (Pei Ching Kung Yeh Ta Hsueh)	Peking	1958
SHANGHAI COMMUNICATIONS UNIVERSITY ° (Shang Hai Chiao T'ung Ta Hsueh)	Shanghai	1896
SHENSI INDUSTRIAL UNIVERSITY (Shen Hsi Kung Yeh Ta Hsueh)	Sian	1960
SIAN COMMUNICATIONS UNIVERSITY ° (Hsi An Chiao T'ung Ta Hsueh)	Sian	1956
TIENTSIN UNIVERSITY (T'ien Ching Ta Hsueh)	Tientsin	1895
TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY ° (Ch'ing Hua Ta Hsueh)	Peking	1911
TUNGCHI UNIVERSITY ° (T'ung Chi Ta Hsueh)	Shanghai	1907
YANGTZE SHIPPING UNIVERSITY (Ch'ang Chiang Hang Yun Ta Hsueh)	—	—

Agricultural Universities

CHEKIANG AGRICULTURAL UNIVERSITY ° (Che Chiang Nung Yeh Ta Hsueh)	Hangchow	—
HEILUNGKIANG AUGUST 1 AGRICULTURAL RECLAMATION UNIVERSITY (Hei Lung Chiang Pa Yi Nung K'ien Ta Hsueh)	Peian	—
HOPEI AGRICULTURAL UNIVERSITY (Ho Pei Nung Yen Ta Hsueh)	Shihchiachuang	—
KANSU AGRICULTURAL UNIVERSITY ° (Kan Su Nung Yeh Ta Hsueh)	Lanchow	1958
KIRIN AGRICULTURAL UNIVERSITY (Chi Lin Nung Yeh Ta Hsueh)	Changchun	—
PEKING AGRICULTURAL UNIVERSITY (Pei Ching Nung Yeh Ta Hsueh)	Peking	before 1957
PEKING LAND UNIVERSITY (Pei Ching T'u Iang Ta Hsueh)	Peking	1959
SHANTUNG AGRICULTURAL UNIVERSITY (Shan Tung Nung Yeh Ta Hsueh)	Tsinan	—
TUMOTEH BANNER AGRICULTURAL UNIVERSITY (T'u Mo T'eh Ch'i Nung Yeh Ta Hsueh)	—	1958

Medical Universities

CHEKIANG MEDICAL UNIVERSITY *	Hangchow	1912
(Che Chiang Yi K'o Ta Hsueh)		
CHINA MEDICAL UNIVERSITY *	Peking	1958
(Chung Kuo Yi K'o Ta Hsueh)		
HARBIN MEDICAL UNIVERSITY *	Harbin	before
(Ha Erh Pin Yi K'o Ta Hsueh)		1957
KIRIN MEDICAL UNIVERSITY *	Changchun	1958
(Chi Lin Yi K'o Ta Hsueh)		
TIENTSIN MEDICAL UNIVERSITY	Tientsin	—
(T'ien Ching Yi K'o Ta Hsueh)		

Universities of Education (Teacher-Training)

EAST CHINA NORMAL UNIVERSITY *	Shanghai	1951
(Hua Tung Shih Fan Ta Hsueh)		
HOPEI NORMAL UNIVERSITY *	Shihchiachuang	—
(Ho Pei Shih Fan Ta Hsueh)		
KANSU NORMAL UNIVERSITY	Lanchow	—
(Kan Su Shih Fan Ta Hsueh)		
KIRIN NORMAL UNIVERSITY *	Changchun	—
(Chi Lin Shih Fan Ta Hsueh)		
NORTHEAST NORMAL UNIVERSITY	Changchun	before
(Tung Pei Shih Fan Ta Hsueh)		1957
PEKING NORMAL UNIVERSITY	Peking	1902
(Pei Ching Shih Fan Ta Hsueh)		
SHANGHAI WORKERS AND PEASANTS	Shanghai	1960
NORMAL UNIVERSITY (Shang Hai Kung Nung		
Shih Fan Ta Hsueh)		
SHENSI NORMAL UNIVERSITY *	Sian	—
(Shen Hsi Shih Fan Ta Hsueh)		

Source: Extracted from Shang Shih, "Mu Ch'ien Ta Lu Ti Kao Teng Hsueh Hsiao" (Higher Educational Institutions in Present-day Mainland China), *Tsu Kuo (China Monthly)*, No. 11 (Nov. 1), 1965, pp. 22-30, and No. 12 (Dec. 1), 1965, pp. 30-34 (in Chinese).

* Many of the institutions included in this list have not been reported reopened since the Cultural Revolution. Those that have been reported reopened after 1969 are indicated by an asterisk (*) after their names.

² The basis for listing an institution as a university is the inclusion of the term "ta hsueh" (university) in its name as given in the source.